)ur Belgrade Gamble

The Reporter

February 5, 1952 25c

Tito



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

Above: How a wartime U.S. internment camp looked to a Japanese painter
Below: a Japanese family leaving its home, 1942 **(see page 21)**

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

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

THE DEADLY GAP

The Taft machine is now hitting on all cylinders, full of bounce and power. From a strictly technical viewpoint, one can't help but admire the way it has been built and is run. It's a thoroughly professional job; nothing has been left to chance. Well ahead of time, when other potential candidates were still attending to personal or official business, Taft and his supporters began collecting Southern delegates, cultivating national, state, and county committeemen and committeewomen, laying the ground for the convention primaries. They are very tricky things, these primaries, held only in a few states, but affecting the politicians' decisions all over the nation. They can be rigged up as traps into which a man of national stature can be lured, and then crushed. This happened to Wendell Willkie in 1944, and that was the end of him.

The Taft machine is now on its third run, and if there were any bugs in it they have probably been ironed out. A political instrument of this sort is meant to register and at the same time to manufacture the people's will. If the manufacturing job is done cleverly and professionally enough, in the end the people just have to take it. They can choose only between the two candidates, and this time it looks as if the politicians in control of both machines will have a field day. Taft wants Truman to run, and Truman wants Taft. The amateurs, the reformers, are the pet abominations of the professionals. They have to be put in their place.

THERE is, of course, the Eisenhower movement. The public-opinion experts keep reporting Eisenhower's popular lead over all other candidates, by such a margin that there is no point in quibbling about the polls' failure in 1948. Some people who know their way around in politics, like Paul Douglas, persist in suggesting Eisenhower as a candidate for both parties.

Then there are all the newspapers coming out for Eisenhower, even in the Deepest South. Most important of all, there are an extraordinary number of men and women who think that a partial moratorium on partisanship is needed and that Eisenhower is the only man who can bring it about. But if only men like Douglas and most editors and such a huge number of private citizens are for Eisenhower, then what is the use? What makes a man a Presidential candidate is a machine.

THIS is a very risky situation. If in November too many citizens have no choice but to abstain or to vote for a candidate they don't want; if the gap between the people's wishes and the parties that are supposed to express these wishes becomes too wide, then the basic ailment of the European democracies has caught up with us.

The weakest links in the democratic system of the major western European countries are the democratic political parties that have become ingrown, unrepresentative, and unresponsive. They are supposed to be the links between the people and their governments—links particularly needed in these times when governments ask so much of people. The way the parties are now, they make the voters skeptical or hopeless about their governments.

Of course, we haven't slid that far in our country—yet. But too many people already feel anguish and despair when they think of the choice they may be asked to make on November 4.

OUR MONARCH

Not long ago, Princess Elizabeth, the future Queen of England, visited Washington. This spring, the Queen of Holland will arrive. Royalty has always had a fondness for our capital. The President is going to have a busy time entertaining these constitutional rulers who, as the saying goes, reign but do not govern.

Come to think of it, this ancient formula describes rather neatly our present form of government under Harry S. Truman. A constitutional monarch has the power of final decision only in moments of national emergency. During the several emergencies that have afflicted his term of office, the President has acted with magnificent daring and with an unfailing sense of right and wrong. Between emergencies, however, the country has been ruled by Congressional committees or by chance.

Perhaps no two of our Presidents have given our country the same kind of government. And certainly none of them has been like this extraordinary man from Missouri, so vigorous in moments of international crisis, so harassed and overwhelmed by the routine chores of office.

THE INDIVIDUAL CHOICE

An ugly sign has come from Panmunjom recently—another indication of the unbridgeable gap between our minds and the Communists'. The Communist delegates cannot figure out what our representatives are talking about when they propose a "voluntary exchange of prisoners," meaning that prisoners may freely choose whether or not to go back to their homelands.

To the Communists, anything that a person does is determined by circumstances and powers beyond his control. If a Chinese soldier who has been taken prisoner decides that he is through with Communism, this can only mean that he has been forced to decide so. The Communist delegates want to have all their prisoners back, wholesale. Then those who have repudiated Communism will be given a chance to confess.

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CORRESPONDENCE

TRUJILLO'S CONSUL CHARGES: (The Reporter *is in receipt of two letters from Dr. Felix W. Bernardino, Consul General of the Dominican Republic in New York, dated November 28 and 30, 1951. Because of space limitations, both cannot be printed. The second, more specific in its criticisms of Theodore Draper's series than the first, is presented herewith.*—THE EDITORS.)

To the Editor: Your articles on President Trujillo, in the November 27 and December 11 issues, leave only one of two alternatives in the mind of any reader who has even a superficial knowledge of the subject. Either the editorial policy of your so-called Fortnightly of Facts and Ideas is motivated by deliberate animosity toward President Trujillo and the Dominican Republic, or you have been ridiculously imposed upon by a writer who is so motivated.

President Trujillo and the people of the Dominican Republic always have been friends of the United States and its people. Just this week, the State Department announced that the government of my country has signed a ten-year agreement giving the U.S. Air Force electronic tracking and control sites in Dominican territory for a long-range guided-missile proving area over the Caribbean. This in addition to being the only country in Middle America that has offered air and naval bases to Washington for the defense of the Panama Canal in case of war with Russia. Your article is about as despicable as it would be possible to write about the government of a friendly country that in two world wars proved itself a valued ally of the United States of America.

The following are only a few of the absolutely false statements that never could have gotten into print in a periodical that concerned itself with facts, as you claim to do.

1. "A former U.S. landing craft called *El Quetzal* flying the Guatemalan flag set out from the Cuban port of El Mariel with a cargo of fruits and vegetables bound for Puerto Livingston in Guatemala."

That is an absolute lie. I was one of the first three Dominican authorities who boarded the vessel in Dominican waters to examine it and question the crew. There was no cargo of any kind on board. The vessel had been fitted out solely for a naval and military invasion of the Dominican Republic.

2. "[Henríquez] was actually a Dominican by birth who had been driven into exile by Trujillo."

Another absolutely false statement of fact, Henríquez was taken to Cuba by his father while still a small boy, twenty-five years before President Trujillo was elected, and has lived there ever since except for a brief sojourn in Europe.

The true FACTS concerning the only connection between President Trujillo and Henríquez are these:

While Machado was President of Cuba, young Henríquez was a member of the A.B.C. Group of young terrorists who kept Cuba in a state of unrest by bombing public places. Henríquez was arrested in the act of placing a bomb and President Machado intended to sentence him to death. Henríquez's father, who was a Dominican citizen, flew to the Dominican Republic and begged President Trujillo to intercede with Machado on behalf of his son.

In response to President Trujillo's intercession, President Machado agreed to pardon young Henríquez on condition that he leave Cuba. President Trujillo gave Henríquez's father the money with which to send him to Paris.

3. "The Haitians represented a threat that had to be beaten back . . . The Haitians still come in each season to work in the Dominican sugar fields, so it was not to keep them out that so many were murdered."

How far from facts can *The Reporter* get? Haitian laborers always have been welcome in the Dominican Republic and it never has been alleged by anybody except your writer that the incident on which you are so poorly informed was to keep workers out of the Republic.

4. "The principal part [in a supposed plot against Haiti] was played by Anselmo Paulino, the dictator's favorite lieutenant, whose wife is a Haitian."

Another deliberate lie. It is true that Anselmo Paulino enjoys the confidence of President Trujillo and is married to a lady of a prominent family in Haiti. But it is absolutely untrue that he had any part in any plot to overthrow the government of Haiti.

5. "First, there was Trujillo's slightly incredible flirtation with the Communists."

Another lie. There never has been any "flirtation" between the government of my country and the Communists. The government of the Dominican Republic did make the mistake of permitting Communist agitators to organize a Communist Party in our country. It did so only because the barring of the Communists from equality in the political life of our country was causing widespread accusations in the U.S. press that the Dominican government was not democratic because it barred the Commies.

But Communists never are satisfied with equality. As soon as they had a party organized in the Dominican Republic they began a subversive movement to overthrow the government, just as they have admitted openly that they are trying to do in the United States. When in 1947 they attempted to cripple the country's economy by calling a general strike, the Dominican Congress passed a law outlawing the party. This was in complete accord with Washington's policy toward the Communists at that time.

6. "The financier of the movement [the Confites invasion plot] was Juan Rodríguez García, a big Dominican landowner whom Trujillo had driven out."

Another brash falsifying of facts that could have been verified.

Rodríguez García went to Cuba frequently for medical consultation with his favorite specialist. While there, he met several Dominican exiles and they persuaded him to help finance the Confites invasion. After which, he remained in Cuba of his own volition.

7. "These unusually undiplomatic memoirs raked up an incident six years old in order to launch an attack of unprecedented violence against former Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden and former U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs."

Nothing of the sort. The articles referred to were published solely to defend the government and the people of the Dominican Republic against the completely false and incredibly violent charges made by Braden in the aide-mémoire.

8. The Communist-dominated government of Cuba is not upset by what it misrepresents as the dictatorship of President Trujillo. Cuba insists it has the right to monopolize the sugar market of the United States and has a lobby in Washington that spends millions of dollars annually to keep sugar from the Dominican Republic and other competing areas from being imported into the United States. Sugar, not politics, is back of Cuba's animosity toward my country.

The last part of your defamatory and completely false article attempts to set up the impression that it is some sort of international crime for a country to expand its industries with its own capital, instead of letting foreigners do it. Yet that policy is what made the United States the great country that it is today. Why is it a crime for my country to follow the example of the United States?

About the only true statement in the article is that the Cuban government permitted public recruiting for the invasion of the Dominican Republic and that the vessels to be used in that expedition were stationed in several Cuban ports. Then the article attempts to make it appear that it was a crime against humanity for President Trujillo and the government to defend our country from such foreign invasion.

The responsible magazines of the United States have research departments that check the statements made in articles submitted

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for publication, even by staff writers. The most superficial checking would have prevented publication of these articles against President Trujillo, unless the first alternative mentioned at the beginning of this letter is the true one and your editorial policy is motivated by deliberate animosity.

A Fortnightly of Facts and Ideas, indeed!

DR. FELIX W. BERNARDINO
Consul General
of the Dominican Republic
New York City

THEODORE DRAPER REPLIES:

To the Editor: Dr. Bernardino's letter is almost too bad to be true. With a single possible exception, his bill of particulars is so boorishly insolent and preposterously ignorant that it is degrading to answer him.

1. *The "Quetzal" Affair.* This "absolute lie" was based on two interviews in Ciudad Trujillo with the ship's captain, Alfredo Brito, reported by the Associated Press and published in *La Prensa* (New York, August 25 and 27, 1951). Brito boasted that he had taken the ship off its course from Puerto Livingston in Guatemala to the Dominican Republic without the knowledge of the rest of the crew. There is not the slightest hint in his statements, made with the blessings of the Dominican authorities, about "a naval and military invasion of the Dominican Republic." The cargo was described in *La Prensa,* August 25, 1951.

Brito's story has been continued in the Dominican Court of Appeals by the head of the Dominican Navy, Commodore César de Windt Lavandier, who testified that Brito took his ship into Dominican custody voluntarily and that, in fact, Brito had been serving the Dominican Navy as an informer against the exiles in Cuba and Guatemala (*La Prensa,* December 12, 1951). Yet Dr. Bernardino wants us to believe that a single little boat, manned by ten sailors and captained by a Dominican agent, was invading the Dominican Republic. Two things are involved here, obviously. I cannot be accused of an "absolute lie" merely for following the only available versions of the incident based on interviews in Ciudad Trujillo. But since Dr. Bernardino, Captain Brito, and Commodore de Windt are so far apart, they will have to decide among themselves who is lying.

2. *Henríquez's background.* This is the single possible exception to the rule. Since I heard dozens of stories about exiles, I may have confused Henríquez with someone else and the detail is being checked. Captain Brito said that Henríquez helped to pay for refitting the boat and I merely mentioned the latter in that connection. Whether Henríquez was driven out or not has no bearing on the *Quetzal* case itself or anything else in my articles.

3. *Haiti.* The allegation was made by Quentin Reynolds, whose account of the Haitian slaughter is classic, in *Collier's,* January 2, 1938. In any case, Trujillo admitted his guilt by agreeing to pay Haiti an indemnity of $750,000 (New York *Times,* February 1, 1938). Incidentally, I did not make the allegation; I scoffed at it.

4. *Anselmo Paulino.* This "deliberate lie" is delightful. I originally wrote the words "principal part" in quotation marks. I was deliberately quoting from an unimpeachable source, the Report of the Investigating Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States, dated March 13, 1950. This distinguished committee was made up of Ambassador Guillermo Gutiérrez of Bolivia, Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia, Minister Alfonso Moscoso of Ecuador, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels of the United States, and Ambassador José A. Mora of Uruguay. Its report of the conspiracy to overthrow the Haitian government in 1949, after an intensive investigation on the spot for over a month, is considered the finest achievement of the Organization of American States.

After concluding that "certain Dominican officials" aided the conspirators, the report added: ". . . Mr. Anselmo Paulino played the principal part in said cooperation" (page 35). Unfortunately for Dr. Bernardino, my quotation marks dropped out in one of the editorial stages. If I had set a deliberate trap for him to trip over "another deliberate lie," it could not have been neater.

5. *Trujillo and the Communists.* Dr. Bernardino merely goes to the trouble of confirming this "lie." He denies none of my facts. He simply tries to make the United States responsible for Trujillo's flirtation with the Communists. He should have explained, however, why Trujillo did not "make the mistake" of permitting a truly democratic political party or the democratic trade-unionists affiliated with the Inter-American Confederation of Workers to organize at the same time. That would have pleased U.S. opinion even more.

6. *Rodríguez García.* I am again informed by a close friend of Rodríguez García that he left the Dominican Republic because he considered his life in danger.

7. *Braden's Aide-Mémoire.* This is another delightful one. The Braden aide-mémoire was dated December 28, 1945. Gracía Godoy's articles came out April 23-28, 1951. Until then the aide-mémoire was a diplomatic secret. To defend the Trujillo régime, García Godoy first had to reveal the existence of the charges (incidentally, in a most distorted form).

And how was it possible for the Dominican Government to restrain itself for five and a half years?

8. *Cuba.* The Communists, who recently were denounced publicly by President Prío Socarrás, will be surprised to learn that they dominate the Cuban government. In any case, Dr. Bernardino protests too much. I wrote that sugar, added to politics, was back of Trujillo's animosity towards Cuba. The Consul-General claims that sugar, not politics, is back of Cuba's animosity towards Trujillo. Both may be true.

The last part of my article tried to show that Trujillo learned from Perón how to stir up a virulent nationalism by attacking "monopolistic international corporations," in this case U.S. sugar interests belong on his side.

There was no suggestion whatever in my articles that it was a "crime" for Trujillo to defend the Dominican Republic against "foreign invasion." The facts show that he has plotted against other régimes as they have plotted against him.

Dr. Bernardino's letter infuriates and amuses me. It is infuriating because it is so brazenly insulting and bullying. He employs the same tactics of intimidation here that he and his kind are accustomed to get away with at home. It is amusing because he has so overreached himself. A journalist who writes about dictatorships must necessarily use sources that cannot be revealed. But the important things that Dr. Bernardino chose to challenge happen to be backed up by documentary evidence.

There is only one thing to be grateful for: The Consul-General unwittingly wrote a most useful footnote to my articles.

THEODORE DRAPER
New York City

NO AMATEUR

To the Editor: We at Sikorsky Aircraft have just read with interest John B. Spore's informative piece "An Army with Wings" in *The Reporter* for January 8. Naturally, our interest here centers in your discussion of helicopters.

In that connection, we were somewhat amazed to read that "The helicopter industry largely developed from the ardent enthusiasm of a few amateurs. In the past several years, trained and educated aeronautical engineers have entered the field and the helicopter developments are being speeded up." We believe that the reader might easily be misled by these statements.

The facts as we see them here are that the United States helicopter industry stems, not from the ardent enthusiasm of a few amateurs, but from the design genius of one of the leading aeronautical scientists of the world—Igor I. Sikorsky. He was no amateur.

Prior to his helicopter success, he was known the world over as designer, builder, and pilot of the world's first multi-engine airplane and for the outstanding flying boats which pioneered airmail and air transportation to South America and the Orient. He and his associates in the helicopter development were backed by the Research Department of United Aircraft Corporation, whose engineers can hardly be called amateurs.

Following Mr. Sikorsky's 1939 solution of the basic problems of helicopter control, a quantity of two-place R-4 and R-6 types were delivered during the Second World War. Today, Sikorsky helicopters are flying in every continent.

Not to labor the point, we feel that the statement that only lately have "trained and educated aeronautical engineers entered the field" is not only inaccurate but grossly unfair to the "trained and educated aeronautical engineers," without whose basic groundwork the newcomers you refer to would have no adequate text.

I am sure that neither John Spore nor *The Reporter* would intentionally brush off so great a contribution to aeronautical progress.

EDWARD M. BENHAM
Sikorsky Aircraft
Bridgeport, Connecticut

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The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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in this issue . . .

In this issue, *The Reporter* tackles one of the most hazardous of our foreign-policy problems—our relations with the dictators whom geography and the Russians have made our potential co-belligerents. The articles by Mr. Raditsa and Mr. Justice Douglas present somewhat different perspectives on Tito's Yugoslavia. The editorial considers our assistance to Tito against the background of the other gambles we have had to take and those we are still taking, particularly with that other dubious co-belligerent, Generalissimo Franco's Spain.

Bogdan Raditsa, now an exile in the United States, headed Tito's Foreign Press Department from March to October, 1945. . . . **William O. Douglas,** Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, visited Yugoslavia during the summer of 1951. . . . **Peter J. Allen** is the pseudonym of a European journalist. . . . **Allen Raymond** has been a correspondent for both the New York *Times* and *Herald Tribune*. . . . **Anne M. Fisher** is the author of *Exile of a Race,* soon to be published. . . . **Seymour Harris** is a professor of economics at Harvard University. . . . **John B. Spore** is Associate Editor of the *U. S. Combat Forces Journal*. . . . **Jacob K. Javits** is the Republican Congressman from New York City's Twenty-First District. . . . **Theodore Draper,** journalist and historian, writes frequently for this magazine. . . . **August Heckscher** is an editorial writer for the New York *Herald Tribune*. . . . **Herbert Mitgang** is on the staff of the New York *Times Magazine*. . . . Cover by **John R. McDermott;** inside cover photographs from INS and Harris & Ewing.

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Our Belgrade Gamble

EVER SINCE the last war, our foreign policy has had to take one long-shot gamble after another. First we had, to mention only the major ones, a Vichy gamble and a Chungking gamble. Later we gambled in Athens and in Ankara, and at present we are risking our physical and moral resources in Belgrade and Madrid.

In all these ventures, the odds have been against us from the start. Not our deliberate choice, but the inscrutable madness of a Hitler or the maniacal reasoning of the Politburo has determined where and with whom we take the hazard of alliance or of co-belligerency. We are still paying off on the Moscow gamble that Hitler forced on us. If the Wehrmacht had driven Stalin out of his country, we probably would have been obliged to set him up in London or in Washington as the leader of a "free" Russian government-in-exile.

There are three main hazards in the co-belligerency gamble. The first is that our military and economic assistance will be recklessly dissipated. If the soldiers who are supposed to use the weapons made in the U.S.A. haven't the heart to fight or if they are led by crooked, incompetent officers, then we become the Quartermaster, and the laughingstock, of the enemy —as happened in our postwar Peiping gamble. Actually there is no sure way to know how the people and soldiers under a tyrannical government feel about their masters: certainly the masters are not particularly eager to let us conduct public-opinion polls.

The second hazard comes from a set of opportunities that are all in our favor but that we may, through lack of skill or determination, let slip. When American supplies are sent to a co-belligerent country, American missions of all sorts go—or should go—with them. No matter how secretive the recipient government is, American journalists and officials get around and inquire and report. Of course, our government should never give anything for nothing to a foreign country, whether allied or co-belligerent, and should require certain conditions of performance, if not of a political at least of a technical nature. We should make sure that the guns we send are manned by competent gunners and that the food goes to those who are starved and not to the black market via the bosses of the local régime.

This has worked in Greece and it has worked in Turkey. It worked in North Africa after our soldiers landed there. If American military and civilian observers can look around and let the people back home know what they have seen, things start happening. At the beginning, it may all be messy and hopeless. Then something like a defrosting sets in. The political situation that the tyrannical régime has tried to congeal starts melting. The régime itself may even, in time, become removable. The people realize that the American intervention may dispel the threat of civil war. Provided, of course, that American intervention is more than a mere shipping operation that drops weapons and foodstuffs and machinery on the docks to be used any way the local potentates see fit.

The third and final hazard comes from the characters of the men on the other side of the gambling table. By and large, they are not persons we would normally choose as business associates. They have won power in ways that their own people are not likely to forget or to forgive. There should never be any doubt as to their utterly unprincipled ruthlessness.

It is equally dangerous—if not plain silly—to treat them with haughty righteousness or with mushy intimacy. They have to be dealt with in an unsentimental, matter-of-fact way. If we assist them, we are entitled to see to it that we get a good run for our money. Eventually our aim is—or should be—to make them expendable. It's a prospect that they may not relish, but they themselves, not only their people, stand to gain if their countries avoid plunging into civil war.

In this issue of *The Reporter* there are two articles expressing rather different views on our Belgrade gamble. It is not easy to know what the real situation in Yugoslavia is, and, for once, we are glad to indulge in this sort of debate. Yet we agree with the main points made by each of the two writers: The Serbian or the Croatian peasant who is given a Garand rifle must know that he is to use it for his country rather than for its régime. To be reassured, he will need to see a far larger American military mission inspecting his ranks than the one at present in Belgrade. On the other hand, in the struggle against Communism, there is no point in following a policy of unconditional surrender. The Communist leaders of any satellite nation who for any reason drift away from Stalinism can count on our assistance. If this assistance is successful, there will be evolution and not revolution in their countries.

It is hard to say how far the defrosting has gone in Belgrade, or whether it has started at all. Certainly Archbishop Stepinac is freer than he was, and Tito has so frequently announced that he will soft-pedal the agrarian collectivization that there might even be some truth in what he says. So far no comparable evidence of defrosting has come from Madrid. Perhaps the secret is that there is no Tito lobby in Washington. In these hard games our diplomats are playing, their chance of success is in direct relation to the absence of pressure from Capitol Hill.

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Can Restless Peasants Make Good Soldiers?

BOGDAN RADITSA

PEASANT opposition to Tito's collectivization program has become intensified at a moment when Tito desperately needs all the unity he can get in Yugoslavia. It would seem that Tito, for the sake of unity, might let up on the collectivization, since it is among the peasants that he will have to find soldiers to defend the country against attacks from the Cominform satellites and their big brother, the Soviet Union.

But Tito, despite this need and despite his hunger for military and economic aid from the West, has felt that he must maintain the façade of "pure Communism." The dictator not only carries water on both shoulders; he is also balancing a bucket on his head just to make the stunt more bewildering. As for the peasants, it is paradoxical to appeal to them to support Tito as long as Tito keeps trying to collectivize them. It would do no good to tell them that collectivization by Tito's Stalinist foes might be worse.

This is only one of the many problems that beset Yugoslavia, but it is a most pressing one. Yugoslavia is undergoing several simultaneous crises—national, international, ideological, economic, and agrarian. The tiny window of freedom cut into Tito's monolithic building by American help has let in light that so far has illuminated more questions than answers among the people.

Communist Lutheranism

If America, so recently the capitalist devil, is now the capitalist quasi angel, why does Tito press his Communism with the same zeal as before? If the Soviet Union and its Balkan satellites are now the Stalinist devils, why does Tito imitate them so closely? The irony of this is that, basically, the Yugoslav peasants are as much opposed to Communism—Tito's or anyone else's—as American farmers would be. And the only real issue in the country is not which ideological faction will triumph but whether Yugoslavia will survive as a nation.

In the first phase of the Tito-Stalin rift, it was hoped that the Belgrade heretic would promulgate a new Communist Lutheranism that would split Stalin's hierarchical empire—that he would carry out a Reformation of the Left. Tito's two main ideological hatchet men, Mosha Pijade and Milovan Djilas, did their best to undermine the Moscow orthodoxy and its petrified Stalinism and to proselytize for a new and pure interpretation of "Marxism-Leninism," with Tito as its schismatic pontiff.

The Yugoslav-Soviet pot-and-kettle diatribes have amused the world, but there has been no rush to jump on the heretical band wagon among either the Moscow followers or the anti-Stalinist left-wing liberals. One good reason for this abstention is a general doubt of the sincerity and integrity of Tito. Only last October the Belgrade ideologists tried to make themselves the focus of opposition to Stalin by holding the Zagreb peace conference, and inviting the most prominent western liberals and left-wing opponents of Stalin. But men like David Dubinsky, Walter Reuther, and Ignazio Silone stayed away, and their absence made it seem probable that there is no possibility of an ideological collaboration between Titoism and free liberalism. An American observer held that the Zagreb conference, instead of lending intellectual and ideological prestige to Tito's position, actually "underlined the question of whether Tito's régime is not ideologically bankrupt."

Cominform and Army

In the second phase of the Belgrade-Moscow split, ideological solvency became of minor importance, and the main question became a military one of just how strong Yugoslavia was, and how well it could withstand an attack from Moscow and its satellites. An appraisal of Tito's army brings out many

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discouraging features. It has only old German, Italian, Anglo-American, and Russian matériel, with almost no spare parts. It is not the well-motorized army that would be needed against satellite Muscovite armies striking across the Danubian plains. Tito's army would have to recoil before a frontal assault, particularly if the Russians were involved directly. His subsequent tactics would involve a reversion to the mountain guerrilla warfare of the Second World War until the arrival of western help.

But what of the army itself? It has, since its very beginning, been essentially a Communist army, in which political indoctrination has been more important than professional skill. Being thus political, it has suffered from the split with Moscow. The officer corps is generally Titoist, but in the lower grades and among the privates the schism is more deeply felt. Cominform agents work industriously among these elements to weaken loyalty to Tito. In the government, too, the top hierarchy sticks to Tito, while the lower grades are susceptible to the work of the Stalinist propagandists among them.

It comes back again inevitably to the question of manpower. Admittedly, no amount of insufficiently armed manpower can withstand an armored attack, but in the second phase—guerrilla warfare, attacks on communications, sabotage, etc.—stubborn, fiercely loyal manpower is essential. Where would Tito get it? He did get it in the war against the Germans, but from men who, quite apart from the motives of their leader, were defending their land rather than an ideological doctrine.

Would he get such defenders again? For one thing, his wartime soldiers came mostly from the peasantry, and the peasants have not had happy postwar experiences with the man who led them. He has tried for new followers by endeavoring to build up and to favor a city industrial proletariat which would be loyal to him. He has thrown the peasants to the mercies of his collectivist doctrinaires.

How to Milk Ducks

The Croatian and Serbian peasants are sturdy, rugged, and highly independent. Always suspicious of city people under any and all régimes, they were particularly resentful when fanatical Communists without farm experience came from the cities and told them how to work their land, how much wheat, corn, or vegetables to plant, what to do with the cattle, the chickens, the eggs. That was bad enough for a start, but when the new masters revealed their ultimate purpose, collectivization, the peasants really got their backs up.

Even Tito's press has been forced to print stories on peasant resistance to collectivization which recall the medieval days when Croatian serfs rebelled against landowners. The official organ *Vijesnik* reported last August 20, for instance, that in the village of Detikovac, Croatia, "A group of women . . . went into a terrific, noisy brawl, shouting 'We don't want any more collectives! We want our cattle back! Let everyone return to his own land!' " In a nearby village a peasant woman had obstructed deliveries of grain to the authorities, telling farmers, "The People's authorities are ignoramuses, and they should not be obeyed!" The party paper *Borba* reported on October 18 that in the rich Zemun district near Belgrade, the people were spending more time trying to think of ways to get out of the collectives than working in the fields. "This type of malingering damaged the crops," the paper concluded, not surprisingly.

Tito, in 1952, cannot send the Yugoslav peasants to Siberia, nor can he, as Stalin did, starve a province into submission. The recent flow of news out of Croatia and Serbia, the two largest parts of Yugoslavia, has told of peasants in the kolkhozes refusing to renew their contracts to remain, while independent peasants have refused to deliver crops to the state and have let the harvest rot in the fields.

The sowing of winter wheat was slowed down to the point of endangering this year's crop. In Croatia and Serbia, not more than ten per cent of the winter wheat sowing was done. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the peasants cultivated only eight per cent of the land. In the breadbasket area of Voivodina, the government was forced to send troops to take in the harvest and sow the winter wheat. In villages on the Adriatic coast, troops were used to suppress a revolt against the collectives. This is the very region from which Tito's best Partisan fighters came during the war.

Skeptical Peasants

Tito, in addition to using what force he can against the peasants, tries to implement his policy with "re-education and persuasion," telling the peasants that they have to accept the collectives for their own good. In Croatia he uses in vain the names of those earlier peasant democrat leaders, the brothers Ante and Stefan Radić, in a distorted effort to get peasant acceptance for Communist practices that the Radić brothers would have loathed and fought with all their hearts.

When the peasants saw Americans entering the country to relieve the famine, and saw the arrival of American tractors, it was hard for them to know what to think. Did the American

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capitalists approve of collectivization in countries other than their own? It must be remembered that, because of the great dearth of modern farm equipment in Yugoslavia, collectivization represented a pooling of backs rather than of machinery. The peasant worked as hard as ever, or harder, but did not have the satisfaction and security of working for himself. When a report went through the countryside that the Americans were going to send thousands of tractors to aid Tito, there was considerable bewilderment. Tito needed these tractors in order to make his collectivization effective. Was it the American policy to help Tito put through his collectivization? The peasants could not believe it.

Some of them asked to be received by the American ambassador in Belgrade. Tito was finally driven to tell the peasants that "neither the American Embassy nor any other embassy is able to interfere" in the policy of collectivization. "Our people," he added, "have understandably been influenced [by the hostile reactionary propaganda against the collectives] and some of them think that the time has come—because America allegedly does not approve of our government—that they can even go to the American Embassy in Belgrade and complain. . . . This is nonsense. . . . Our citizens have the right to complain only to us."

The 'Menace' of Freedom

Tito's statement is illuminating. A totalitarian state cannot have successful relations with the free world without jeopardizing its own position at home. Tito, isolated from the Communist world and loosely tied to the West, sees his domestic opposition growing. The politically shrewd peasantry cannot accept the idea that American technology would be used to disrupt the peasant's own economic and political freedom. American aid is extended to Tito, naturally, not because of any admiration for the schismatic Communist leader but simply because he is a foe of Moscow. Yet Tito counts on American economic aid not only to better his military situation but for putting over Marxist-Leninist measures on an unwilling people.

Off Again, On Again

It is true, of course, that Tito's Government has recently declared that the whole policy of collectivization will be re-examined. But within a matter of only a few months Tito has changed

the policy on collectivization no fewer than three times. First, it was admitted last summer that the peasants, particularly in Croatia, had won their fight against the collectives. Then last fall a firm determination to carry on with collectivization was announced. And now the traditional democratic word *zadruga* ("co-operative") is being used in order to make the collectives seem more attractive. Perhaps Tito will retreat from doctrinaire insistence on collectivization under double pressure from the West and from his own peasantry. But Tito is certainly familiar with Lenin's saying that it is sometimes necessary to take one step backward in order to take two steps forward.

This would be only a question of moral responsibility if it did not also affect the more relevant question of Yugoslavia's position in Europe's strategy. Yugoslavia's military potential is made up of the peasants. To organize resistance in the country, Tito and the West must somehow meet the demands of the peasantry.

The military situation can only be improved if American information services make it clear on what basis aid is being given to Tito. It must be understood in Yugoslavia that America is interested not in the ideological issue between Tito's and Stalin's interpretations of Communism, but in the survival of Yugoslavia as a nation.

The Sick Man and the Doctor

There ought to be an end of the farce of the sick man demanding that his physician pay *him* for the privilege of curing him. As the price for equipment and other aid, an American military mission could insist that the army be made efficient. That would necessitate the abolition of the political commissars and the transformation of the army into a purely military force. The peasants would welcome the idea that they were defending their country and not an ideology, and they would appreciate being led by professional officers rather than by doctrinaire blowhards.

If the army is not made professional, there will always be a danger that its armaments will fall into the hands of Stalinists at home or of Stalinists who will come as "liberators." Finally, the United States must make a stronger effort to explain its strategy and rally the Yugoslav people's sympathy for that strategy. Tito himself is hardly able to accomplish such a miracle in a country that is, for the most part, sick of Tito.

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A Wedge of Freedom In a One-Party State

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

HAS Yugoslavia turned to the Right and forsaken Communism? Is Tito's break with Stalin real or is it feigned? What is the nature of Communism in Yugoslavia? Can any Communist régime be a faithful collaborator with the West in works of peace?

These are among the most important questions facing the West today. The recent history of Yugoslavia provides some of the answers.

The world was stunned and puzzled when Stalin and Tito fell out in 1948. Some thought it merely a quarrel between brigands—a quarrel that would be patched up in a devious way. Aren't all Communists alike? Haven't they a conspiratorial project to devour the earth? These were the doubts in many American minds four years ago—and to some extent they persist.

Yugoslavia is going through a counter-revolution. This revolution is not against Communism; it is against Soviet colonialism. Tito's quarrel with Stalin is a quarrel that every Communist satellite could have with Soviet Russia and probably will have eventually. Russia is an imperialist power: It has colonies. Its colonial system is more oppressive and more vicious than any other form of modern colonialism. What Russia tried to do in Yugoslavia is illustrative:

The Soviet Union put a deputy in every department of the Yugoslav government and demanded that he dictate policies.

It opposed building a Yugoslav national army.

It opposed the industrialization of Yugoslavia.

It planned to maintain Yugoslavia as an agricultural nation, a producer of raw materials, shipping its ore, lumber, and the like to Russia for processing and manufacture.

By 1948 such Soviet demands were growing increasingly exacting and onerous. Moreover, the Yugoslavs were learning from their neighbors—Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary—how dry the Soviets could squeeze a satellite. Tito's Politburo realized that Stalin's Politburo was making Yugoslavia a vassal state. That realization was the beginning of Yugoslavia's counter-revolution. Its nature and power are rooted deep in Yugoslav history.

The Yugoslav Mixture

The Yugoslav nation is a mixture of many groups—Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins—to mention only the major ones. A Yugoslav who migrates to this country enters the great American melting pot and in a generation or so becomes one of us. In Yugoslavia there has been little melting until now; the nationalities have lived side by side in isolation—an isolation born of distrust, religious and cultural differences, and ancient wars. These differences have been kept alive by invaders. Yugoslavia has been the crossroads of conquerors: Romans, Turks, Austrians, Germans. The massive fort in Belgrade—on the height overlooking the junction of the Sava and the Danube Rivers—has been conquered 154 times.

At the end of the First World War, Croatia and Slovenia in the north were detached from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia, on the south, though bled white, had fought on the winning side. A new nation was created, ruled by King Alexander and a Serbian clique—army, police, and bureaucrats. Yugoslavia was rich in copper, lead, and bauxite. It had great forests and a flourishing cement industry. But most of this wealth was owned by foreigners who took the profits from the country. And the government lived on bribes paid by these foreign interests to maintain their hold on the country.

Why They Were Communists

This venal and oppressive type of capitalism produced many Communists. Pijade—No. 3 man in the Politburo—told me it had made him one by 1920. (For his conversion he spent thirteen years in jail, translating *Das Kapital* and painting water colors.) In 1920, the Communist Party had fifty-eight Deputies in the Parliament. These were not Moscow-trained. Most were not even intellectual Marxists, like Pijade. They chose Communism because its violence alone semed able to match the violent oppression in which Yugoslavia was held.

Under Alexander, farmers and their families constituted about seventy-five per cent of the population. Their plots were small; royalty and the churches had the great holdings. Yugoslavia is a fertile country, but it was difficult for

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the peasants to raise enough to live. There was only one plow for every two families, one cart for every three. The peasant regions—where even today collective farms are unpopular—hunted desperately for economic and political remedies.

Some Yugoslav Communists had been trained in Russia. Tito, for one, had spent five years there. But Communism in Yugoslavia was mostly a native variety—never well attuned to the party line and often rebellious when reminded of it. Under Alexander the Communist Party was soon declared illegal and driven underground. Yet it grew.

As I have said, Yugoslavia has traditionally been a great invasion route. The Nazi attack in 1941 was merely another in a long series. But the Yugoslavs had always resisted the invader by moving into the mountains to wage guerrilla war. They did this again in 1941; this time they had the Communist Tito as a leader.

Tito Before and After

Under Tito they became probably the most effective guerrilla force in history: Men and women sniped, raided, hid, marched by night and day. Nor did the Partisans wait until they had cleaned out the Nazis to set up a government. They had a national government under the occupation—an underground parliament, to be sure, but an effective one.

When victory came, the Partisans were the only effective political organization in the country. They had saved its independence, and Tito had the loyalty of the great mass of the people.

Until 1948, Tito followed the Soviet blueprint. His Parliament has an upper and lower house with 215 and 405 members respectively. This in turn chooses the Presidium, a council of thirty-eight that handles legislative policy. The chairman of the lower house, Vladimir Simic, is a non-Communist, the head of the old Republican Party. Ivan Ribar, president of the Presidium, is not a Communist, although his Communist son died in battle for the Partisans, and was perhaps closer than any other Partisan to Tito. At any rate, there are non-Communists in the Government.

A few million of the 17 million Yugoslavs are members of the People's Front. Of these, only half a million are Communists. In Belgrade, people are proud of the tolerance of non-Communists.

That tolerance cannot, however, be taken at face value. For Yugoslavia, like Russia, has placed the *real power* in the Communist Party. From its membership, a Central Committee of sixty is chosen; from the sixty, a Politburo of nine. Basic decisions are made by the Politburo; the Parliament meets perhaps a half dozen times a year to ratify them.

Yet there is something to Yugoslavia's tolerance of non-Communists. The Partisans—though Communist-dominated—were always a diverse group. Their unifying idea was not Communism but independence—independence from foreign exploitation of all kinds, as well as from the Nazis.

So it is that Tito is no longer taking Communism in all its rigors. He is leaving room for some diversity. His popularity springs not from Marxist slogans but from his opposition to foreign military invaders and foreigners who use Yugoslavia as a colony to exploit.

The Clean Break

Today it is not foreign companies with offices in Paris and London that threaten to bleed the country: It is Stalin and his Politburo. The Yugoslavs know this, and the bitterness they once directed against King Alexander and his clique they now direct against Stalin and his Politburo.

The break with Russia is complete. Russia has used every ounce of economic pressure, every device to strangle commerce, every propaganda weapon to bring Yugoslavia into line. But the greater the effort, the greater Yugoslavia's resistance and the greater Tito's popularity. The Yugoslavs want their independence as passionately as we wanted ours in 1776.

All this does not mean that Tito has turned against Communism. Communism is still the way of life in Yugoslavia today.

All industry is nationalized. All transport is nationalized. UDBA—the secret police—keeps a close watch on individuals. Confiscation, with all the usual Communist ruthlessness, was the pattern followed to put the industrial power of the country in the hands of the government.

Practically all retailers have been nationalized. One who window-shops today sees only one set of prices—monopoly prices fixed by the government. They are high—sixty dollars for a pair of nylon stockings, four dollars for a loaf of bread, five dollars for a rubber ball, $125 for a pair of men's dress shoes. One cannot cross the street and get a better price from a competi-



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tor: There are no competitors; the state owns and controls every store. The Main Street merchant has disappeared.

Few private businessmen are left. In Belgrade, there is a barbershop of four chairs where I got a haircut. The owner seemed very apprehensive. All large barbershops had been nationalized. Were four chairs too many? Should he remove one?

Yugoslav Communism

All the same, there are differences between Yugoslav Communism and the Soviet brand.

First, Yugoslavia has two presses—the People's Front papers and the Communist papers; and in recent months the two have gone at each other hammer and tongs on certain issues.

Second, the United States Information Service can display democratic propaganda; people can, and do, throng into its building. Yugoslavia is happy about this venture in education, for it helps orient the people to their new-found friends of the West. As the USIS pictures and placards went on display, the pictures of Stalin came down. There are no portraits of Communist leaders on the buildings.

Third, the agricultural program has not gone very far toward the Communist goal. Five per cent of the agricultural population work as government employees on state-owned farms, which raise most of Yugoslavia's pork. Twenty-five per cent work on collective farms, each family owning a home and a small tract of land. Seventy per cent are private farmers—as ruggedly individualistic as farmers anywhere. Tito is no longer pressing as hard as he used to for collective farming. "The passion for landownership is too great," the official told me.

The practice in Yugoslavia, as in other Communist countries, has been to issue farm quotas. The amount of wheat, corn, or pork required from a particular area was transmitted to the local Communist Party committee, which determined each farmer's share. The farmer was then under compulsion of law to deliver it even if this meant buying it on the market. The party committees sometimes used their power at the village level to discriminate against nonparty members, to place oppressive penalties on recalcitrant farmers, to exact personal vengeance, and so on. The revolt against the quota system has been rising high, and the system is now largely being abandoned.

Fourth, there are signs that the rationing system will be revised or abandoned. Under it only party members, government workers, laborers in factories, and the like get ration cards. They are the *proletariat;* everyone else is a second-class citizen with no guarantee of minimum requirements of food and clothing. Moreover, he must pay much higher prices. Nylon hose, bread, and shoes can be bought by the holders of ration cards for one-fifth of the usual price. Even at that level prices are high; but the preferential treatment is tremendous. However, steps have been taken to modify the entire system.

Fifth, the Yugoslavs are beginning to borrow some ideas from the West, including a concept of civil liberties, so foreign to Communism. I sat with the Supreme Court of Yugoslavia at dinner in a hotel overlooking Belgrade and the plains of the Danube. Law officers of the government were there; so were Members of Parliament. We heard speeches; we talked about law. And the topics had the flavor one finds in legal discussions here:

The vice of coerced confessions and the best way of controlling or outlawing their use in criminal trials.

The desirability of giving every accused the right to counsel; the necessity of seeing to it that every man on trial for his life or liberty be represented by a lawyer.

The need for an independent judiciary, for judges who are beholden to no man, group, or party, for judges who are in a position to stand against the tide of popular and official opinion and follow the law and their consciences.

I was called upon to speak. I spoke of the struggle of man for freedom and justice. I spoke of the function of the law in providing a curb on officials of the government as well as providing a deterrent to crime and a forum for settlement of private disputes. I mentioned that during the ages man's fight against tyranny had been his fight

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against the absolute, uncontrolled discretion of an official of government—sometimes a king, sometimes a dictator, sometimes a Politburo. I reviewed the history of our government and our system of checks and balances. I ended by saying that the real test, the true test for determining whether a country was committed to the cause of liberty, was whether it allowed prisoners to use the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of their detention. If they could, then the discretion of the official under whose order they were detained could be tested. Then a nation had a government of laws, not of men. It was only under a *government of laws* that true liberty could flourish. That was the substance of my speech.

The Power of Ideas

The next day I sat with a legislative drafting group that is revising the Yugoslav code of judicial procedure. Its members told me they were planning to introduce the writ of habeas corpus into Yugoslavia and thus show the world that they too want to live under a *government of laws,* not of men.

I do not know how far Yugoslavia will go in guaranteeing civil liberties. Certainly it is not to be expected that the régime will overnight refashion its concept of the rights of man and restate those rights in the language of the West.

One thing, however, is clear. The Yugoslavs are not looking to the West only for loans, food, and technical advice. They are also looking to the West for ideas that will help them maintain their independence and escape Soviet domination and regimentation. This episode in Belgrade is an eloquent illustration that even in the Communist world, ideas of freedom and justice are potent forces. Ideas are the important weapon. Guns and dollars are important too. But ideas come first, guns and dollars second. Ideas have pried Yugoslavia from Russia; ideas have saved it from Russia's new colonial empire.

These ideas have set up violent reactions in Moscow, for they are dangerous to Stalin and his Politburo. What Yugoslavia has done, other Communist countries can do. This talk of habeas corpus, fair trials, the ban on coerced confessions—these are preposterous notions to the orthodox Communist. And so the Moscow radio set its sights on me. It said that I, "a known spy"

and a "judicial expert," had done "much to transplant the lynch law outside America." And it added: "What is the aim of his visit to Belgrade? Undoubtedly he will exchange his experiences with another hangman—Rankovic," head of UDBA. And the more Yugoslavia wrestles with the problem of the police and fair trials, the louder will Moscow shriek.

George Allen, our ambassador in Belgrade, is doing a brilliant job in helping the Yugoslavs realize their new ambitions. American influence today is strong; and it can continue to increase, provided we keep faith in one important regard: respect for the independence of Yugoslavia. If we do, we can demonstrate that even a Communist East and a democratic West can work and live together in peace.

Diversity in Communism

We have long known that Soviet Communism was a conspiracy against the free world. Yugoslavia—and other Soviet satellites—now realize that Soviet Communism is also a conspiracy against them. That is why they are looking to the West, particularly to the United States, for counsel and help.

I was twitting one of Tito's Cabinet officers about this. I said that according to Radio Moscow and the Moscow press, America was merely another "imperialistic" power bent on "aggression and exploitation." He smiled and replied that he knew from history that the charge was not true.

"The history of America's relation to other nations proves it," he said. "In all its history, America has never had a colony. Moreover, today America need not exploit other nations, for America is already strong. On the other hand, Russia thinks it must exploit other nations—suck them all dry—in order to get the strength to conquer the world."

As this inveterate Communist talked of Russia's conspiracy against all nations, memories of earlier conversations and dinners and luncheons in the United States flooded my mind. I remembered when Tito was denouncing us for flights of American planes over Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs then seemed truculent, unreasonable, hard-boiled, impossible to deal with. At that time they were playing the role in which Stalin had cast them and reading the lines he had prepared.

But we erred in thinking that they were irrevocably lost to reason and decency. They are still Communists. But by their deeds they are proving that all Communists are not *necessarily* alike; that there is developing within the Communist world diversity in ideas and in programs; that the Communism of a particular nation may, if given the chance, abandon the rigid pattern of the master plan prepared in Moscow; that there is no such thing as the inevitability of a bloody conflict between Communism as such and the West.

A Vulnerable Point

The grand political strategy of the century is clear. We must, of course, remain strong and prepare our military defenses. But our great efforts must be at the political and diplomatic level. The Soviet Communist empire under construction in Europe and in Asia has an Achilles' heel. It is the colonial status of the nations inside the empire. It is the fear they have of Russia and the new serfdom which the Soviets have prepared for them.

The rebellion against colonialism—whether Russian, British, or French—is the most powerful revolutionary force in the world today. It affords America the unique opportunity to guide and direct the counter-revolution against Soviet Communism and to defeat Soviet Russia at the political level.

What we do in Yugoslavia points the way. What we do on a small scale there we can do on a grand scale not only in other countries of eastern Europe but in Asia, where the stakes of the struggle between Soviet Communism and civilization are the greatest.

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On the Danube Frontier Of Yugoslavia

PETER J. ALLEN

One of the few remaining points of contact between East and West is a little waterfront café in Veliko Gradichte, Yugoslavia. Three hundred yards to the east of the café lies the Danube, separating Yugoslavia and Romania. On the opposite shore, the sloping terraces of the Banat Plateau descend toward the river. The Romanian earth looked dark and rich to me on that sunny winter afternoon I spent in the café.

But there were no peasants readying the soil for the winter sowing, nor were there any cattle or sheep in the meadows.

On the river's edge there were villages, but they too seemed deserted. Through binoculars I could find only one man and his dog in the nearest village, Belobrechka. On the outskirts along the river were observation towers, each with two soldiers manning machine guns. Near them was a curious round hill—an underground bunker, according to the Yugoslav frontier guard who had lent me the binoculars.

Two miles to the west of Belobrechka was another church and about fifty houses. This, I was told, was Divic. Divic, too, was a silent town flanked by observation towers. To the east lay another dead village. It is barely seventy miles to Belgrade, but except for an afternoon boat from Veliko Gradichte there was no other way to get back after the departure of the bus from the Information Office, which had brought me to the river outpost. There would be a mail truck the next morning at eight going to Pojarevacz, the railway terminal twenty miles away. But the road is full of holes, and driving is slow. The boat is the best way to travel. Some French newspapermen with whom I had made the trip from Belgrade that morning were going back by bus, but I decided to wait for the boat.

The trip by bus from Belgrade to Veliko Gradichte, through Serbia, passes through a region that is far from the twentieth century. Endless fields, few hills, dirt roads. The *kochavo,* the strong wind from the east, raises a gray, penetrating dust which slows down horses and men. The dust is everywhere—in the curly lambskin of the men's hats and under the shawls of the peasant women. It penetrates into every house.

The last outpost of civilization east of Belgrade is Smederovo, with its teeming market place, its steel mill, and its crumbling fortress where five hundred years ago the Serbs met the Turkish invasion. The steel mill is fed by the mountains of scrap iron that are piled along the road—bent and rusting rails, smashed railroad cars, trucks, skeletons of old buildings.



After Smederovo, no attempt has been made to build a hard road to the Danube. The trail cuts through fields. Peasants guide primitive iron plows drawn by oxen or horses. Rumbling carts filled with sugar beets make their way along the road with difficulty, avoiding holes and bouncing in the ruts. The villages are small, just a few thatched huts.

But in Veliko Gradichte, on the Cominform border, the traveler returns to the twentieth century. Here an army that has been trained in modern warfare is on guard.

Along the main street the bakery, the bookstore, the butcher shop, and several cafés were open. There was a movie house with posters advertising "Blanche Fury."

The Watery Curtain

The Danube is the last link between Yugoslavia and the Cominform States. The convention governing its shipping, signed after the Tito-Stalin split, is the last strictly observed international treaty between Yugoslavia and the Cominform bloc. Until now there have been no serious incidents involving the Yugoslav, Hungarian, Romanian, and Russian ships that ply the river carrying goods and passengers.

Veliko Gradichte is a stopping point for most of these river boats. The day I was there, a 600-ton motor ship carrying wood from Romania to Budapest lay beside the dock, flying the red,

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white, and green flag of Hungary. The captain and crew were in the café. As the Yugoslav police checked their papers, the Hungarians drank Yugoslav slivovic and munched salami on dark rye bread.

The captain looked under thirty, and his first mate had the shy smile of a boy of twenty. Their black uniforms were torn in places, and neither had shaved recently. The crew members, in dirty working clothes, smiled and accepted my American cigarettes—after the captain and mate had lit theirs. The crew spoke only Hungarian, and so all communication with the men from the ship had to be through the captain, who spoke Russian, and the mate, who knew a little German. There was no tension apparent in the café. The owner of the café, whose name was Philip, exchanged conversation with the two ship's officers while his wife wrapped bread, canned meat, and sardines in newspapers for them.

The atmosphere became so cordial that the Hungarians invited me and the French newspapermen to pay a visit aboard their vessel. It looked old and very dirty. The captain's cabin was a closet on the starboard side. Aft were the galley and the tiny officers' mess, most of it taken up by an oilcloth-covered table. The mate pointed to a portrait over the door to the galley. "Rakosi," he said, "the *Kommunisten-führer.*" Near the portrait sat a silent, unattractive blond girl—the cook and the only woman among the eleven men.

Perils in Photography

A French photographer busied himself taking pictures, and the Hungarians smiled obligingly for him. But a few minutes later, after we had returned to the café, the mate arrived, visibly perturbed, to plead with the photographer: "Do not publish pictures where our faces could be recognized. It would be terrible for us. We aren't allowed to let anybody on board."

The photographer gave his promise, but the Hungarian youngster was still frightened. "Can't you destroy the whole film?" The Frenchman shook his head, but again promised that he would protect the captain and the crew.

As the Hungarians began untying the ropes that held their boat to the rotting, half-sunk barge that formed the dock, the captain and mate still watched the Frenchmen apprehensively.

I was told that it might be a day before the next ship docked at Veliko Gradichite, since low water had made navigation very difficult. The *Zagreb,* one of the two large passenger boats that normally travel the 150-odd miles between Belgrade and the Bulgarian border, is out of service. A smaller boat, the *Rijeka,* the one I was planning to take back to Belgrade, was scheduled to arrive at two in the afternoon. But it was already after two, and it was not yet in sight. Golubacz, the next town downriver, had not announced its arrival there.

The Last Outpost

On the waterfront, a stone's throw from the docks, stands a two-story gray barracks. Lieutenant Juro Pevic of the Frontier Guards, dressed in a Russian-style greatcoat, was in command at Veliko Gradichte.

"We have no fortifications here," he said, "but we can stand up. First there is the Danube, and then . . . We do not want to attack. We don't return fire when they shoot, but if they really mean it, and are not just trying to provoke us, we are ready."

Private Mirko Georgevitch had been shot at a few days before, and had counted eight bullet holes in the trees around him after he had taken cover. Two weeks earlier, twenty-three Romanian bullets had whizzed around a group of Yugoslav civilians on the outskirts of Veliko Gradichte, and the garrison had been alerted.

Lieutenant Pevic told me that he spent much of his time observing the movements of Romanian military trucks through his binoculars. At night, he said, he usually heard the roar of their motors, and in a full moon he could distinguish their silhouettes as





the truck convoys crept along with their lights dimmed.

Down the Danube from Vienna and Budapest, Cominform boats carry Skoda trucks and machine tools from Czechoslovakia as well as Austrian oil and Hungarian bauxite. The non-Russian boats, like the one I had boarded, often stop at Veliko Gradichte, but Russian ones rarely do. If for any reason one of them does, I was told that only the captain goes ashore, and a sentry equipped with a submachine gun slung around his neck is usually stationed at the gangplank.

Human Seepage

Many refugees from the satellite countries pass through Veliko Gradichte. Most are sailors on the Danube boats who have landed before, looked around, talked with the Yugoslavs, and drunk their slivovic. The sailors buy meat and sardines and resell them at a profit at home. Then, sometimes, they come back and ask to stay.

Usually, Philip's café serves as reception center for the refugees, and it is Philip himself who calls the police to interrogate the new arrivals. The Yugoslavs—particularly those on the Danube across from Romania—are a suspicious people. They have reason to be. Saboteurs have constantly tried to filter through, and some have succeeded, after claiming a convincing hatred for their native Stalinists and for the Russian occupiers of their countries. The first clearance for the refugee is followed by a few days of

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observation, whereupon he is sent to an inland center for new questioning and renewed observation.

At Philip's that same afternoon, I met Ferdinand Reider, twenty-three, an escapee from Hungary. He told the French journalists and me that he had spent three years in the coal mines of the Donets in the Ukraine, after the Russians had deported him from Hungary in 1945. He seemed anxious to impress the Yugoslav commissar in Veliko Gradichte, an unshaven young man wearing a worker's cap.

Reider had small black eyes that shifted rapidly from one of us to another. He told us he had been deported to Russia because the Soviets had mistaken him for a *Volksdeutscher*—a Hungarian of German stock who had received preferential treatment under Hitler's régime—but that in fact he was pure Magyar. His German-sounding name, he said, had been responsible for the mistake that had cost him his freedom and his health. He spat out his hatred for the Communists in rapid, faulty Russian.

In the Ukraine, he said, there were only police and spies. Everybody was afraid. The foreign workers like him didn't get enough to eat. The work was hard and the punishment for any mistake severe. At home now, in Hungary, it was not much better. You worked (he explained that he had been a builder's helper) and you didn't get enough pay. You could not buy anything with what you got. The rations were small and the black market beyond a worker's reach.

True Colors

By now Reider had become less wary. The foreign journalists in the café were taking careful notes and showing their sympathy. They wanted to know who could afford the black market in Hungary.

"The Communists . . . and the Jews."

The Jews? The foreigners seemed surprised. "Yes, the Jews. There are still some left. They are responsible for everything. I know something about it. My brother was an S.S. He stayed in Berlin after the war. Now he has left for the United States. Maybe I can join him there. No, I was not an S.S. myself. I was too young. Of course I am a *Volksdeutscher*. It was fine under the Nazis. People were killed, that's true, but they were Jews."

Reider by now had dropped all his pretenses. After all, the foreigners were French and American—friends of Hitler and his successors. He had been told over and over again that westerners are fascists. And this was the state governed by Tito, who is denounced daily by the Budapest radio as an agent of world fascism.

Someone asked Reider about what would happen to his family in Hungary. He squirmed. "My heart aches," he said. "They will be deported and hanged, my mama and papa." His right hand was over his heart. His eyes shifted from face to face looking for sympathy. But one of his questioners had not heard well. Reider repeated his performance, his right hand over his heart. "My mama and my papa . . ."

The Yugoslavs listened impassively. After Reider had been led away, someone asked what the Yugoslavs would do with him. One of them shrugged his shoulders. "We'll take him to the Italian border. One night our guards will tell him 'Go straight ahead . . . we won't shoot. Just look out for the Italian border patrol.' These characters don't interest us."

Privately, some Yugoslavs will admit that not so long ago they would have put a bullet through Reider's head. After all, a Nazi more or less. . . . But now, they say, methods have changed. Of course, Reider is not the only type of refugee who crosses from the Cominform countries into Yugoslavia. I had occasion in Belgrade and Zagreb to meet men with fine anti-fascist records who had fled their Russian-dominated countries not because they believed the Cominform propaganda but because they didn't.

Questionable Language

The café was crowded now. A Yugoslav boat traveling downstream had stopped at the dock. The commissar, the lieutenant, and Philip were sitting with the ship's officers around a wooden table. The travelers had stories from Belgrade and from farther west. They had come all the way from Regensburg, Germany, stopping at Vienna and Budapest.

It was five o'clock. The sun was setting, and still no word from our ship, the *Rijeka*. Philip's wife prepared some "Serbian tea"—slivovic and melted sugar. A cup was brought out for me. The Frenchmen had already departed on their bus.

A young man in a gabardine coat and a cap joined me. He lit a Chesterfield, and told me he found it strong but liked the flavor. His name, he said,

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was Ivanovitch. He was the third Ivanovitch I had met that afternoon.

Soon the table was crowded. We began talking about life in Veliko Gradichte before the war, and about life before the split with the Cominform. We were all speaking Russian. Suddenly one of the Ivanovitches stopped, and his small, dark eyes seemed to freeze. "You speak Russian very well indeed," he said slowly. "With no accent."

Suddenly the ties that had seemed to exist between myself, a foreigner, and these border Serbians were cut. These men had begun by accepting me and had talked to me as they would to a friend. Ivanovitch had abruptly broken this sympathy. The foreigner spoke Russian without an accent.

No one was convinced by my explanation that I had had a Russian mother and had learned the tongue as a child. Neither were they convinced when I started to tell them about attending Marshal Tito's press conference that week. I was alone in Veliko Gradichte, and my Russian was too good.

I began talking about the United Nations, and about Ales Bebler, then Yugoslavia's delegate on the Security Council. I mentioned in passing Yugoslavia's U.N. correspondent, Anton Smole.

The eyes of the third Ivanovitch became narrow slits. "Anton Smole?" he asked, deliberately drawing out the syllables. "We know Yozhe Smole, who speaks over the radio from New York. But no Anton."

What would have been the consequence of my easy Russian if I had not suddenly remembered that Anton used his partisan name, Yozhe, in his broadcasts I do not know.

Lights Across the River

Darkness had fallen. There was not a light, not a flicker from the Romanian shore. The Danube was black and silent.

Ivanovitch pointed across it. "They deported everybody over there last June," he said. "It took them two whole days and seventy-five trucks to empty Belobrechka. We could watch it all. They got everyone together and started loading them and a little bit of luggage into the trucks. Men, women, and children had to walk a gantlet of militiamen armed with machine pis-

tols and submachine guns. There was a lot of crying and a lot of pushing around. . . . Now the army has taken over. There are about fifty soldiers permanently stationed in Belobrechka. When they had to harvest the crops, they brought in more troops. The only civilians that come to the town are spies, or peasants who attend to the needs of the troops."

Darkness on the Waters

The Yugoslav boat had finally left, and Philip, the café owner, came over to sit at our table.

"The people in Belobrechka were originally Serbs, most of them," he told me. "They had a lot of relatives over here, and we knew them. They were a happy bunch—had plenty to eat and drink, loved music. They visited us in the evening—before the Cominform resolution, of course—and we went over to visit them. There were always lights across the river."

By six o'clock, the optimism that everyone had shown about the arrival of the river boat for Belgrade had given place to the typical Slav resignation. "There is an inn in town," I was told at the dock. "You could spend the night there. And tomorrow you can take the postal truck."

The waterfront was dark. Only Philip's café gave out a glimmer of light. Near the dock, four peasant women who had been waiting for the boat since one in the afternoon were still there. They had sought refuge from the wind behind the wooden guardhouse. As I walked back toward the café, a man—whose name was probably Ivanovitch—accepted an American cigarette eagerly.

"As soon as you arrived," he said, holding me by the arm to guide me around the rough spots in the street, "we were told by the police inspector that you were a foreign journalist and liable to ask us questions. The inspector told us to talk all we wanted about the other bank of the Danube. But then he said, 'If he asks you about Yugoslavia—well, you read the papers. You know what to say.' "

Away from the dock and the waterfront, there were lights in the streets. They were dim, barely illuminating a few feet of the cobblestones. Some stores were closing for the night. The man spoke very little. He did not mention whatever it was that the police inspector had feared he would tell me. All he had to say was that life in the border town was dull.

It was cold outside, but back in Philip's café it was cozy and warm. Beneath the portraits of Tito and the secretaries of the Politburo, Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Djilas, and Alexander Rankovitch, the short-wave receiver was bringing in a Voice of America program from Paris. We turned the dial—Budapest. The refugee, Reider, looked up from where he was huddled in a corner, and then looked quickly down. He didn't want anyone to see that he was interested in Budapest.

Philip rushed in. "The *Rijeka* is coming. I just saw the lights."

The *Rijeka* was tied up at the dock. The peasant women unloaded their carts. Two of them went on the boat over the slippery wooden gangplank. I followed them.

'They Would Shoot'

The boat stayed two hours in Veliko Gradichte to take on coal. Finally the lines were cast off and we moved toward the middle of the black river. On deck the wind was strong. The boat's searchlight was carefully pointed at the Yugoslav bank. "They would shoot if we turned it in *their* direction," the captain told me. It was about seven miles from Veliko Gradichte to the point where the Danube began to flow through Yugoslav territory. Only an occasional navigation light glowed through the darkness.

The captain, who had traveled this route many times—both before and after the war—sighed nostalgically. "This used to be a gay stretch along here," he said.

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President, Pentagon, and Press

In spite of the efforts of the nation's editors, the areas of legal secrecy in government are expanding rapidly

ALLEN RAYMOND

DURING the last months of 1951, American newspapers, news magazines, news agencies, and newspapermen were caught between two fires because of their reporting of the Korean War and America's defense efforts at home. President Truman delivered a series of heavy barrages from one flank, while Generals Douglas MacArthur and Charles A. Willoughby did some nasty sniping from the other. Naturally the editors of newspapers and magazines developed a slight case of combat fatigue.

Basically the conflict is merely one contemporary skirmish in the eternal quarrel between a nongovernmental commercial press, customarily known as a free press, and high-ranking agents of popular government. Each contestant is engaged in selling its version of current affairs to the reading public.

There is a novel importance in the current skirmish, however. It is based principally on the fact that there is an expanding area of secrecy in American government today, without parallel in the nation's history. This growing secrecy in government springs partly from the state of national emergency declared by President Truman on December 16, 1950. It springs from the war in Korea and the far greater undeclared war of unpredictable duration being fought between the United States and Russia. A running quarrel is now under way between the President, the Pentagon, and the press over this area of secrecy in government which bars information to the public on matters of so-called "national security."

By the very nature of its being, the commercial, competitive press seeks all the information of interest to readers about what their government is doing—up to the very limit of what the individual editor or publisher believes within his own conscience to be legitimately a governmental secret. That which is legitimately secret, they would all concede, is information so precious and vital to national safety that it may be committed to only a few supremely trusted agents of popular government, to be used as they deem fit.



Joseph Short

At first blush it might seem that there would be very few such secrets, even in these days of fantastic new weapons now being developed by both the United States and Russia. Each of the two great powers is known to engage in espionage within the territory of the other. As for the persons to whom the American people would entrust such secrets, by overwhelming vote these would be very few.

Who Is to Know?

There is the President of the United States, of course; members of the President's National Security Council; such officers and guards of the military forces as may be concerned; a few scientists who are engaged, presumably with heavy hearts, in the most diabolical of research; members of the Atomic Energy Commission; and a few other persons in such agencies as the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Not many, surely.

Even a Senator of the United States is not entitled to know a great many things about the nation's atomic-energy program. When Brien MacMahon of Connecticut, one of the most eminent members of the upper house, suggested recently that the Senators might be better informed about the progress of the program, President Truman brushed him off. If there was any popular demand to give the Senator more information, it certainly was not reflected in the press.

But a wave of loud bickering began last September 25, when President Truman issued Executive Order No. 10,290, covering so-called "security information." This order, issued to all executive agencies of the Federal government, established and made uniform certain "minimum standards for

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the classification, transmission, and handling, by departments and agencies of the executive branch, of official information which requires safeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States."

The order had been drafted after approval by the National Security Council. One of the two committees of this council, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, is to administer the order, through a subcommittee of five men. Four of these will represent the State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice Departments. The fifth, yet to be named as this is written, will be the executive for the subcommittee. The council is looking for a newspaperman.

In theory at least, and perhaps in practice, this executive order of the President's will extend to all departments and agencies of the Federal government a uniform system for the so-called "classification" of documents or material objects containing unpublishable information pertaining to national defense. Classification of documents into four categories—Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Restricted—has been practiced for some years in the State and Defense Departments. But its extension into all branches of the American government as announced by President Truman is something quite new.

Protest and Counterblast

It caused an immediate protest by many American newspaper editors and by *Editor & Publisher,* a trade journal of the press. Four days after the order was issued, the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, representing 1,700 newspapers, voted unanimously at a meeting in San Francisco that the order was "a dangerous instrument of news suppression."

The President had issued the order without showing why it was necessary, the editors said. It was drawn without regard for the lessons of the Second World War, "when the government achieved a workable compromise of the sometimes conflicting claims of complete information and absolute security." No public discussion or debate had preceded it. The editors named Herbert F. Corn, managing editor of the Washington *Star,* to communicate their views to President Truman—which he did on October 17.

General Charles A. Willoughby

Before adjourning, the editors noted that state and local officials also were following in the train of the national government, and were multiplying their efforts to conceal information to which the public was entitled.

A few days later, the President issued another of his blasts at the alleged irresponsibility of the American press. The press, Mr. Truman declared at a conference with reporters, had already given away ninety-five per cent of the nation's military secrets, according to a study he had received from some researchers at Yale University.

He conceded that some of the press's information had come from news releases of the Federal government, and then asserted that the country's editors themselves had a duty to defend the United States by guarding military secrets, or information that might be valuable to the enemy, even though it might have slipped out by mistake from some governmental agency.

This theory of Mr. Truman's, that in the haste of making up a newspaper an editor should be a court of review in the field of national security, was absolutely absurd to most newspapermen.

One small-town editor, Milton Ronsheim of the Cadiz, Ohio, *Republican,* a weekly with 4,000 circulation, said what other editors were thinking. He returned to the Pentagon some photographs of helicopters sent to him as Air Force publicity, commenting:

"Mr. Truman has advised the press not to trust such departments as yours in making releases, but to investigate and decide for themselves. No one in our office has the time or the knowledge to make this delicate decision, and we will not risk getting Hell from Harry over Helicopters."

The upshot of the visit by Mr. Corn and a few colleagues to President Truman on October 17 to protest against Executive Order No. 10,290 had been an invitation by the President to the editors to make some constructive suggestions for improving the order. The President recommended that the editors themselves rewrite the classification definitions, and promised to modify the order on the basis of suggestions he found definitely constructive.

The executive committee of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association declined to undertake any such task, on the ground that the order itself "erects dangerous barriers between the people and their Government." Apparently they were still insisting that the order should be rescinded. That being so, the President stood firm also, and accused the editors of standing off to one side to carp and criticize.

MacArthur and Willoughby

The quarrel between the President and the editors over the matter of security versus information stands right there at this moment. Meanwhile, late in November, a bitter attack by Generals MacArthur and Willoughby upon some of the most distinguished practitioners of daily and magazine journalism served to highlight the great gulf that exists between some military men and newspapermen as to what is true and proper war reporting.

With the published blessing of General MacArthur, General Willoughby took as his targets Homer Bigart of the New York *Herald Tribune,* a Pulitzer Prize winner among the veteran war correspondents; Hal Boyle of the Associated Press, who ran the late Ernie Pyle a close second for his vivid stories of the Second World War; Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York *Times,* military critic; and Joseph Alsop, a syndicated columnist whose articles frequently appear in the *Saturday Evening Post.*

The writings of these men, Willough-

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by alleged in a vitriolic article published by Hearst's *Cosmopolitan,* have been steeped in defeatism during the fighting in Korea, and have so grossly maligned the nation's fighting men as to impair their morale and give the enemy aid and comfort. He accused the press in general of pouring "a cataract of venom" upon General MacArthur's Pacific operations from 1941 to 1951, and of being irresponsible and mischievous during the fighting in Korea.

His subordinate's story, MacArthur said, was "one of the greatest importance, because the entire effort to distort and misrepresent the causes leading to the existing situation [in Korea, presumably—or perhaps his dismissal from the Far Eastern command] represents one of the most scandalous propaganda efforts to pervert the truth in modern times."

To those who served as correspondents with these two generals in the Southwest Pacific during the war and in Japan during the occupation—and I was one of them—the petulance of both is quite understandable.

Railing at the perversity and evil ways of newspaper reporters has been a habit of MacArthur's for years, and his technique is to delegate responsibility for the spoken attack to his close associates. During the occupation of Japan one of his public-relations officers, Brigadier General Frayne Baker, wrote letters to no fewer than nine newspaper editors and publishers, protesting that their correspondents were lying maliciously about the occupation and playing into the hands of the Communists, who were out to discredit the Supreme Commander.

This was all done behind the backs of the reporters, who never knew they were being attacked until they received letters of inquiry from their superiors back home. The press corps in Tokyo finally became so exasperated with these tactics that they obtained through the Defense Department a ruling that commanders in the field who wished to complain of newspaper reporters to their publishers should first clear their complaints with the department.

Abuse of Censorship

The abuse of the powers of censorship within General MacArthur's headquarters has been notorious in newspaper circles. Old-time correspondents in the Philippines campaign remember well the day when MacArthur landed triumphantly in Leyte. As part of the news program for that great day the radio reporters had scheduled a brief talk by Admiral Kinkaid of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, who had played no small part in bringing MacArthur and his forces north from Australia.

The admiral was unceremoniously barred from the microphone by Brigadier General LeGrande B. Diller, then MacArthur's chief public-relations officer. "Nothing today will be permitted to interfere with the glory of the Commander in Chief," General Diller told the amused reporters, using the censor's power to deprive the Navy of its fair share of credit in the nation's victory.

No wonder, then, that newspaper people generally are skeptical about the uses to which censorship is put. If it is used by MacArthur and associates for self-glorification, to what uses would it be put by men of lower ideals?

The Truth Will Out

Efforts by newsmen in combat zones to get home word of what they have seen and heard, independent of Army communiqués, which are colored by the requirements of psychological warfare, are quite properly subject to Army censorship. But no system of censorship yet devised is a truth-tight Iron Curtain. Little by little, and bit by bit, the news seeps through.

This was illustrated late last fall, when the Associated Press, the International News Service, the Chicago *Daily News,* and the Canadian Press all reported a *de facto* cease-fire along the Korean fighting front. The correspondents reported a lull in the fighting due to orders reaching the front lines which were interpreted by company commanders in just one way: United Nations soldiers were not to fire unless fired upon. They were to hold their ground, pending continuation of conversations with the Reds at Panmunjom, which might shortly result in an armistice. Chinese and North Korean troops were so well aware of these orders that they played volleyball and lit bonfires openly within shooting range of American troops.

Joseph Alsop

Keyes Beech of the Chicago *Daily News,* an ex-Marine combat correspondent, toured the front for a hundred miles and could find no fighting. John Rich of INS, a former officer in the Marines, took a wire recording of a company commander's order to his men to hold their fire. The details of the order which reached the troops were then a military secret at Eighth Army headquarters, even when the fact was well known to the enemy that some order resulting in the lull in hostilities had been issued.

Fragmentary dispatches concerning this order and the ensuing quiet along the front reached the United States from many sources. Somewhere along the line there had been a slip-up in the effort of American military (and perhaps political) leaders to cast a veil of secrecy at home over a fact that was known to the enemy.

A single Associated Press reporter from Tokyo, telling of what was happening in Korea, inserted a speculative phrase into the fourth paragraph of one of his dispatches. He took note of the political implications of a cease-fire order, and raised a doubt whether such an order could have been issued from Eighth Army headquarters without prior knowledge, and perhaps even prior direction, on the part of the White House.

'Fakery' and 'Hogwash'

This mild bit of speculation aroused the wrath of President Truman, then on vacation in Key West, Florida. On November 29 and 30, he and his secretary applied the word "fakery" to one Associated Press dispatch, and "hogwash" to another.

On November 30, White House Sec-

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retary Joseph Short revealed a part of the orders that had gone to the front-line troops in Korea—just that part which coincided with the political policy of the Administration. The gist was that a firm pressure must be maintained against the enemy until an armistice was signed. Mr. Short said he knew of no other part of the order.

It took until December 3 for the Associated Press to clear up the mystery of what was in the rest of the order. The paragraph quoted by Mr. Short, it turned out, was merely a preamble to detailed instructions, issued to the troops from Eighth Army headquarters, as to what should and should not be done pending an armistice.

The policy of the United Nations forces for the time being, the order said, would be to avoid all unnecessary casualties, to demonstrate a willingness to honor an armistice when one was obtained, to maintain defensive positions and send out only reconnaissance patrols against the enemy, and to avoid engagements with the enemy unless threatened.

There were other instructions of similar tenor, and the effect of every one of them was to stop the shooting. The Communist enemy showed an equal disposition to stop shooting at that very moment, which would lead one to believe that Red intelligence must be very good indeed.

What does this sequence of events reveal? It reveals that the commercial press informed the public with a fair degree of accuracy on what actually was happening in Korea at the time, even when working under conditions of military censorship. When its reports ran counter to the professed political policy of the White House, it naturally incurred the wrath of the President.

The Pentagon

Independent nongovernmental reporting of defense efforts at home has incurred the wrath of the Pentagon also. While visiting friends there recently, I was amazed at the bitterness with which they attacked the press for giving away military secrets. It was principally due to the influence of the Pentagon within the National Security Council, I became convinced, that Order No. 10,290 was promulgated.

Within the Pentagon, the press, including such news magazines as *Newsweek* and *Time* as well as the daily newspapers, is being assailed continually for printing what ought not to be printed. It is assailed for premature revelation that the United States is building a great new airbase in Greenland. It is assailed for having told far too much about new guided missiles, such as the Matador. It is accused of prematurely revealing plans to send the 45th Infantry Division from Japan to Korea. It is censured for having printed the exact number of B-36 bombers this country recently had in operation, as told by a United States Senator after an Executive Committee meeting of the Senate had listened to testimony of high-ranking military officers.

One officer in the Pentagon, of sufficient rank to reflect a fair consensus of the military mind, told me he believed one of the gravest dangers to the country's military security today lay in the senseless and irresponsible competition among American newspapers to be first with the news.

Within the offices of the National Security Council I found an absolute conviction that the President's order extending the system of classifying secret governmental information was necessary for the safety of the country. I was told that the fears of newspaper editors that the system would be abused were groundless, and that the real effects of the order had been exaggerated.

Byron Price

While in theory it extends to every department of government, I was told, in practice it will be confined to those agencies responsible for guarding the country from sabotage, subversion, and espionage in producing our weapons of war, and for conducting our foreign policy. The central area of secrecy was defined for me as the following departments and agencies: State, Treasury, Justice, and Defense, the Office of Defense Production, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Customs offices, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

How Much 'Downgrading'?

I was told that the study of the security regulations of all these agencies made before the Presidential order was drafted showed that there was a great deal of overclassification of public documents. Many were classified as more secret than was necessary.

The new committee to police the classification of governmental secrets and the guarding of them, I was told, would be composed of information officers as well as security officers. One of its tasks will be "downgrading" of governmental documents, so that newspaper editors will be likely to receive more information rather than less about governmental affairs within the necessary secrecy area.

It was a rosy picture that the National Security Council spokesmen painted for me, but skepticism concerning the system is still rampant in newspaper circles. The reasons for this attitude are briefly three:

1. Experience has shown that all devices of censorship, including the classification of news within government departments according to secrecy values, are used to cover up the blunders and add to the renown of officeholders and to deceive the public.

2. Rivalry for publicity in the press exists between governmental agencies having access to the same information. Even when it is classified as Secret or Confidential, it is apt to leak to the press, since one agency may release news that another would hold back for its own advantage, perhaps to show how well it is doing with public moneys

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or to enhance its chief's reputation.

3. There is no general agreement today among the agencies themselves as to what should properly be kept secret during a time of national emergency of indefinite duration, as there was during the all-out hostilities of the Second World War. There certainly is no agreement between government agents and the representatives of the press.

Peacetime Censorship

Until the government agents themselves can agree as to what should be secret and what should be revealed in times like these, the leaks of partial and sometimes erroneous information to the press are bound to continue, with continued attacks on the press for publishing what it is told on creditable authority.

There is today a small school of thought, both within government and journalism, that some such voluntary system of censorship for the press as was established under Byron Price in Washington during the Second World War may yet be required to protect specific and legitimate military secrets of the country if the period of national emergency is long drawn out. Yet the whole idea of such a censorship system in peacetime is repugnant to most newspapermen and to most government officials familiar with the principles and problems involved.

Today's conflict, then, between the requirements of national security versus public information remains unresolved. The mere extension of secrecy classifications to government documents in more departments, according to some uniform standards, does little to allay it, despite the heavy penalties prescribed by law for government agents who reveal the nation's secrets.

Neither the President, the Pentagon, nor the press, nor any combination of two of them, can solve this problem. Under the American system of government there will have to be nearly unanimous agreement as to what is proper and workable secrecy within the government and what isn't. Otherwise the cries of wrath and outrage that have characterized the recent approach of all three parties to the matter will be continued, and the basic national problem will remain unsolved.

Debt of Dishonor

Deprived of liberty and property in 1942, West Coast Japanese are still waiting for proper indemnification

ANNE M. FISHER

"THE MOST striking mass interference since slavery with the right to physical freedom was the evacuation . . . of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast during the past war," according to a report issued in 1947 by the President's Committee on Civil Rights, composed of fifteen distinguished Americans. The committee's report continues: "The evacuation of 110,000 men, women and children, two-thirds of whom were United States citizens, was made without a trial or any sort of hearing . . . no specific evacuees were charged with disloyalty, espionage or sedition. Finally it should be noted that hundreds of evacuees suffered serious property and business losses because of governmental action and through no fault of their own."

Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at Yale, has written even more forceful words: "Time is often needed for us to recognize the great miscarriages of justice. . . . As time passes, it becomes more and more plain that our wartime treatment of the Japanese and Japanese Americans on the West Coast was a tragic and dangerous mistake. That mistake is a threat to society, and to all men. Its motivation and its impact on our system of law deny every value of democracy."

Deathbed Extortion?

Almost ten years have passed since our West Coast Japanese were rushed from their homes, farms, and jobs on a few hours' notice. The originally meager provisions for making amends for the economic losses these people suffered have now almost sunk to the level of an unethical lawyer's machinations for cheating a dying man.

The Evacuation Claims Act, passed by Congress in 1948, was not overly generous, merely providing compensation to the Japanese for minimum losses up to $2,500. But when this law was passed, it was assumed that such claims would be paid fairly promptly, and without the requirement of extensive proof. By March 1, 1951, the Claims Division of the Department of Justice had spent some $250,000 for intensive investigations and hearings among the Japanese and had approved the payment of indemnities totaling exactly $25,000. In other words, the department had spent ten dollars in administrative expenses for every dollar paid evacuees. Over 22,000 claims, totaling $133 million, had been filed. Through the department's offices in Los Angeles and San Francisco and its thirteen field attorneys, an average of fifty-five

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claims a month were going to Washington. At that rate it would take thirty-six years to settle them all.

'Pots and Pans'

H. Graham Morison, Assistant Attorney General, summed up the department's attitude: The majority of claims are "what we call the 'pots and pans' cases—cases small in amount which generally involve household items; we have a very difficult job in these small cases. . . . If we are not careful, lawyers' claims can slip by that should not be paid. We must treat the claims as we would a lawsuit. . . ."

A retired Japanese minister and his invalid wife, fearing that they might pass from this world long before their claims were paid, made a special appeal for prompt consideration. Months passed. Then suddenly two FBI agents appeared and questioned the couple. Then, two other agents appeared in the inland town to which the couple had been evacuated, interrogating persons who had known them there. A minutely exact report then presumably went to Washington.

After more months, the Department of Justice informed the minister's wife that the "fair and reasonable value" of her long-missing furniture was not the $380 she had claimed, but $356.72.

In August, 1951, the Evacuation Claims Act was amended to give evacuees an alternative to waiting. By slashing their claims by one-fourth and answering massive questionnaires, they were promised speedier payment. Under the new procedure, a six-page affidavit is followed by sheets headed Marital Status, Crop Schedule, Land Schedule, Building Schedule, Business Schedule, Motor Vehicle Schedule, Life Insurance Schedule. Finally, to cover the "pots and pans" losses, comes an Itemized Statement of Personal Property, requiring the following information:

ITEM LOST OR DAMAGED (List each item separately)	DESCRIPTION (Type, size, brand, model, year of manufacture)
. . . .	
DATE OF PURCHASE AND COST (Specify new or used)	IF SOLD, DATE OF SALE AND PRICE OBTAINED
IF LOSS OCCURRED OTHER THAN THROUGH SALE, STATE HOW LOSS OCCURRED	

Imagine, if you can, giving the personal life history of your pots, pans, percolators, and perambulators. One claimant listed a Boston terrier pup. Would it be "new" or "used"? His size was "small," his model was "Boston," but "year of manufacture" was rather a puzzler.

Also try to imagine keeping records of who bought your pots and pans and how much you got for them under the circumstances described by Judge William Denman of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:

"The inevitable followed, after the meaning of the [evacuation] orders was understood. Unscrupulous secondhand dealers bought family possessions for a song. One can picture a widow bargaining [over] the family bedstead and kitchen stove while measuring the . . . load of her infants. Nor can one fail to apprehend the bitter sense of frustration . . . of the farmer trying to sell his partially matured crop . . . to avid buyers who know the seller is but two or three days from his stockade."

'Get Out at Once!'

Imagine yourself as one of the Japanese on Bainbridge Island, Washington, who woke up in the gray dawn of March 23, 1942, to find posters giving you one week in which to dispose of your worldly possessions, after which you would be hauled away with what you could carry.

It was easy for those in the seats of power to issue a proclamation, as President Roosevelt did. It was easy for military officers to carry out their vast grants of power. It was not so easy for the soldiers who had to load the weeping mothers and children into trucks and haul them away, often with the family's dog racing madly after the truck.

So rapid was the evacuation that within two months after the first order was issued, over 100,000 persons of Japanese descent had been placed behind the barbed wire of so-called Assembly Centers—our first concentration camps for racial prisoners.

When a person has been wrongfully imprisoned, it is generally felt that society has an obligation to compensate him. A conservative estimate of the total economic losses suffered by the evacuees has been set at between $350 million and $400 million. The $133-million total of the original claims represents about one-third of actual losses. The amendment that provides for the "compromise settlements," which almost all the evacuees are accepting, slashes off another fourth, but the cutting does not end there. On a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, and without explanation, the Claims Division of the Justice Department frequently takes another slice off. The following is a breakdown of some of the payments:

Original Claim	*Compromise Settlement*	*Awarded by Justice Department*
$1,232.04	$ 924.44	$ 441.23
2,282.00	1,712.00	1,418.00
257.50	193.00	164.00
477.00	352.00	157.50
1,067.00	800.00	357.00

In such cases, evacuees are notified that their compromise settlement has been rejected, but that the Attorney

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General can now pay them the sum listed under "Awarded by Justice Department." If they don't want to accept this, they are told, they may await the regular processing and adjudication, but the form concludes with: "However, if you sign this paper accepting the sum set forth below, the payment thereof shall be final and conclusive for all purposes."

On the bottom of some notices the following words have been written in:

"Claimant's losses occurring during internment not compensable. Losses during that period payable only to extent of wife's interest therein."

Inherent in that ruling, if it is allowed to stand, is a dangerous international precedent that could open the door for confiscation of property of U.S. citizens in foreign countries.

At the outbreak of war and during several months thereafter, about five thousand Japanese aliens were taken into custody by the FBI and placed in detention and internment camps. Not one person thus interned was ever charged with any act of disloyalty, sabotage, or espionage, either before or after Pearl Harbor, on the mainland or in Hawaii.

Terror on Terminal Island

The idea of the evacuation was born in California's rich Santa Maria Valley, where Japanese farmers held a dominant position in supplying and marketing fruits and vegetables for the vast Los Angeles market, and it was there that the FBI immediately took into custody every prominent Japanese farmer. Ordinarily the farmers' families could have kept things going, but then their families were evacuated, and the losses are therefore directly traceable to the evacuation.

Claims filed by Alaskan Japanese or those who suffered losses when evicted from Terminal Island, off Los Angeles, prior to the actual mass evacuation, are also in doubt. On Terminal Island the FBI took over four hundred alien Japanese into custody, and some three thousand others were told they would have to leave. The latter were assured they would be given thirty days in which to settle their affairs. Then, without advance warning, the Army moved in. Soldiers arrived with machine guns, fixed bayonets, and Federal condemnation writs, to order everyone out within forty-eight hours.

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Pandemonium broke loose. Soon the streets were filled with junk dealers and speculators bidding for household goods, boats, and fishing gear. Some buyers threatened to report the Japanese to the FBI if they refused their offers. The War Relocation Authority, in its final report, stated that "junk and secondhand dealers were buying furnishings valued from fifty to two hundred dollars for four and five dollars by telling the panicky families that the government intended to seize their household belongings. Since no official statements were made in this period, victims were strongly inclined to believe the rumors of the moment."

No Debt to the Dead

To date the Department of Justice Claims Division has ignored inquiries regarding the status of claims filed by the Terminal Island and the Alaskan Japanese who were evicted before the subsequent large-scale evacuations. The only reply to specific questions about these claims, as well as about the claims of interned Japanese, was in the form of mimeographed statements giving general information but nothing whatever about the subject of inquiry.

The world-famous Japanese Tea Garden in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park, started by Makoto Hagiwara in 1894 and after his death continually improved and beautified by his children and grandchildren, was taken over by the San Francisco Park Commission on three days' notice. Soon the Hagiwaras were sent to a camp. Three years later they were permitted to return to San Francisco, homeless and penniless. They found the tea garden leased to a non-Japanese, and discovered that sixteen truckloads of rare trees and shrubs, valued at $200,000, had been hauled away. The family told a reporter they could not afford to hire a lawyer.

At one time a proposal was made for a flat indemnification for all evacuees. From the taxpayer's standpoint, as well as that of the evacuee, a flat indemnification would certainly be preferable to the present time- and money-consuming red tape. Two thousand dollars for each evacuee over twenty-one years of age at the time of evacuation (of whom there are about forty thousand) and five hundred dollars for those under twenty-one (of whom there are about seventy thousand) would amount to only $115 million. Provision could be made for those having greater losses to file for compensation according to accepted government practices.

Certainly it seems unforgivable to place the evacuees in the position of litigants, to force them to relive the unhappy days of their evacuation by having to recall all of the harrowing details of uprooting their homes on a week or ten days' notice. The older generation of Japanese were in their declining years at the time of the evacuation—most of them having come to this country between 1900 and 1910. Thousands have already died, and each day West Coast papers list the names of others to whom our debts can never be paid.

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Why the Government Need Not Subsidize Medical Schools

SEYMOUR HARRIS

WE FACE a serious shortage of doctors. The continued growth and increasing longevity of the population, the demands of the military, and expanded public-health facilities will all contribute to the shortage. And, since the time it takes to educate a doctor is becoming longer and longer, we had better prepare now for the medical requirements that will exist a generation from now.

The A.M.A.'s Case

The impending shortage may amount to forty thousand doctors ten years hence. But the American Medical Association, even while conceding that a serious situation exists, goes right on supporting protective restrictions along old-fashioned trade-union lines. A Senate bill to give medical and other health schools about $40 million yearly is still being debated. The A.M.A. opposes it.

The A.M.A. has bombarded the public with literature designed to minimize the shortage. The A.M.A. case rests largely on the improved quality and the increased efficiency of the doctor, now aided by magic drugs, the automobile, and teamwork. The able medical economist of the A.M.A., Dr. Frank Dickenson, has put that message over very effectively.

But the fact remains that the number of medical graduates in 1949 was less than in 1905, when our population was less than three-fifths of what it was in 1949. Dr. Howard A. Rusk, chairman of the Health Resources Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization, has estimated the deficiency at 24,000 by 1954. He also disagrees with the A.M.A. about how much of the physician's time has been saved by the technological progress. It is possible to envisage even worse shortages than that which Dr. Rusk foresees. By 1975 the shortage could exceed 125,000 doctors.

But whether the shortage is 24,000 or 125,000, the medical schools face disaster without aid of some kind. Their financial situation is such that they must either train too few doctors or train too many inadequately.

The need for more doctors springs not only from the increase in our population. More of our people than ever before are demanding decent medical care. Private insurance already covers seventy-seven million people, but, as has been shown in Dr. Dean Clark's excellent survey for the Lehman Committee of the Senate and in other official studies, only from ten to twelve per cent of all private medical costs are thus covered. As private insurance expands and as demands of veterans for medical services from the government grow, the demand for more medically trained men and women will greatly increase.



Poor Circulation

We need not only more doctors but also a better distribution of doctors. Doctors must somehow be lured into smaller communities. The seriousness of the maldistribution is suggested by a questionnaire sent to physicians in the armed services in 1944; it revealed that only one per cent of the physicians in-

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tended to practice in the smaller communities that contain forty-four per cent of the population. The shortage is already so serious that urban areas are outbidding rural areas for the services of newly trained doctors.

Clearly, something must be done to strengthen the dangerously weak financial structure of medical schools so that they can turn out enough well-trained physicians to meet the nation's needs. In the past, the medical schools have lived off their parent universities, to a large extent, but the financial plight of the latter is bringing this source of help to an end. Over the last forty years the cost of a medical education has gone up by about ten times. According to their accounting, the medical schools subsidize the average medical student by about $2,000 a year, or $8,000 over a four-year course.

Who Should Pay?

Where is the money to train the extra medical students going to come from? Not much can be expected from higher tuition fees, reductions in expenses, and increased endowment. And the pressure of the A.M.A. will probably continue to prevent Federal subsidies.

Why not make the future doctors themselves pay? Perhaps they couldn't all pay up during their student years, but why shouldn't they obligate themselves to pay for their educations on the installment plan? Doctors can look forward to quite comfortable average incomes, and the obligation would not turn out to be burdensome if each student agreed to pay two per cent of his income during his working life. The current crop of medical students can probably look forward to average lifetime incomes of at least $600,000. At that rate, each could pay an average of $12,000 to his medical school after he began practicing. Many could afford to pay $2,000 during training, and the total of $14,000 should cover their expenses. It would not seem unfair to require a medical student to pay the full costs of his education, since he obtains a license to practice in a restricted field that may yield him a lifetime income of more than half a million dollars, two to three times the income of the average college graduate. If the payments were deductible for income-tax purposes, the government would in effect be footing a large share of the bill without worrying the A.M.A. about government control of, or influence on, medicine.

One difficulty would have to be overcome. There should be agreement among the medical schools that students would pay according to average costs. Otherwise schools in strong financial condition would be able to entice the best students with the offer of cheap tuition.

It will, of course, take a number of years for the two per cent payments of physicians who benefit under the plan to mount up. In order to avoid the use of government funds which the A.M.A. finds so objectionable, this gap could be filled by voluntary contributions from practicing physicians who have already benefited from the subsidization of medical schools in the past. The sizable sums now being spent on propaganda might be better spent in this way.

In many ways, this plan is an improvement on Federal subsidies. Why should the average American wage earner subsidize a doctor who will make four times as much as he ever will?

The Great Rifle Controversy

JOHN B. SPORE

THE Great Rifle Controversy between the United States and Great Britain ended in a draw in the second week of 1952. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had told the House of Commons on December 6, 1951, that he was "not at all sure it is to our best interest to embark single-handed" on the production of the new British rifle, "even if [it] is better than others put before us." A few days later the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps had placed a "multi-million-dollar" order for the manufacture of more U.S. Garand (M-1) rifles.

That cinched it. If the NATO armies (excepting the British) are to have a standard rifle, it will be the U.S. caliber .30 semi-automatic M-1—a weapon proven in Second World War combat and widely distributed to armies receiving U. S. aid. This result was foreseen by those who knew the facts. Britain has only twenty of its new rifles, all presumably handmade. The machine tools and other facilities necessary to produce the rifle and its ammunition in quantities would take a tremendous bite out of Britain's strained industrial facilities. In contrast, we have thousands of M-1 Garands and the tools to turn out great quantities of new rifles and ammunition fast.

These facts must have been known to Emanuel Shinwell, Labour's War Secretary, so that his journey to Washington last summer to "sell" the new

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British rifle as NATO's standard remains a puzzle.

The recent actions of U.S. Ordnance are also a puzzle. After Ordnance had resisted for months all efforts to get it to reveal officially the newest rifles and ammunition it had developed, it suddenly staged a press demonstration of them at the Aberdeen Proving Ground on December 27. This demonstration merely made official what correspondents who had covered the rifle controversy had long known and already written: that Ordnance had developed lighter rifles than the M-1, but of the same caliber; that they will fire either semi-automatically (the trigger must be pulled for each shot) or automatically (as long as the trigger is held down the rifle will fire until its magazine is empty of ammunition), and that we have new rifle ammunition lighter than standard M-1 ammunition but just as powerful.

There was only one rational reason for the demonstration: Ordnance didn't know it had carried its point, and, frightened at the imminent visit of Mr. Churchill, decided to show the world that it had not been idle either.

What Do They Want?

Ordnance believes that its caliber .30 is the most effective cartridge for the present and for the new weapons it is developing. It questions whether smaller-caliber cartridges have enough of what it calls "stopping" or "wounding" power. Unofficially one of its criticisms of the British caliber .28 rifle is that it doesn't have enough impact. This factor not only includes muzzle velocity (the speed in feet per second that the bullet leaves the muzzle) but also such factors as weight and size of bullet.

Actually the question boils down to: "What do we expect of the rifle in combat?" That question has not been answered conclusively by either the combat soldiers or Ordnance technicians. I know of no sentence or paragraph in any field manual or technical manual that states explicitly what the Army expects of either the rifle or the rifleman. However, it can be figured out pretty closely.

The rifle is, of course, a weapon of self-protection. But it is also a team weapon, its fire being used in volume with the fire of machine guns and other infantry weapons. But infantry weapons are not the greatest inflictor of casualties on the armed enemy. Artillery has been the leading killer in both world wars, and it may be that air power has inflicted the most enemy casualties in Korea, for reasons peculiar to that war and to the nature of our strength in the early months.

When the rifleman advances to attack, he rarely sees the enemy. But training and experience have taught him where the enemy probably is, and as he advances he fires at those probable places, not with the idea that he is causing many casualties but because he has learned that such fire makes the enemy keep his head down and his return fire sporadic and unaimed.

If this picture suggests that the rifleman neither needs to be an expert marksman at medium or long ranges nor needs a rifle that is accurate and lethal at long ranges, it bears out the views of more than a few combat infantrymen. They say they want a light, fast-firing weapon, preferably fully automatic.

Many other infantrymen consider this heresy. These traditionalists insist that every soldier should know how to fire his rifle accurately at middle and long ranges and that a military rifle should be a refined precision tool, firing bullets of great stopping power and range. They shudder at the thought of the ammunition that would be "wasted" if every rifleman had an automatic weapon capable of firing a hundred rounds a minute.



'Caliber of the Future'

The British, it is clear, were quite conscious of these technical and practical aspects when they devised their new rifle. Their development of the caliber .28 (actually 7 mm.) came when they were convinced that it was the "caliber of the future." U.S. Ordnance has not officially acknowledged the practicality of a smaller caliber, although one of its small-arms experts has told me that the real reason the British drummed so hard for their rifle was that they believed we would adopt it or one of a similar caliber before long and they thought it would be wise for them to go all the way now. This expert even granted that they might be right.

Also, both of Ordnance's new rifles—which have selective semi- or full-automatic fire and are lighter than the M-1—are a long way from production.

It would appear that the British have advanced more rapidly than we have. Also there is evidence that Ordnance has been less than candid with a close ally. Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon, who had a great deal to do with the development of the new British rifle, has written: ". . . one of the greatest difficulties which we in the United Kingdom encountered was the secrecy imposed by the U.S. Army Ordnance on all their developments . . . [while] we continued freely to send to the States all information about our plans and developments . . . we received no information whatsoever in return. . . . I think anyone would be justified in calling this at least a pretty lop-sided method of standardization."

Jealousy and Firepower

The Truman-Churchill statement of January 9, while indicating that the British will go on with their Lee-Enfield .303, promises that ". . . a common effort [will be] made to devise a rifle and ammunition suitable for standardization."

Thus there is some evidence that the most important lesson of the controversy has been taken to heart. This is obviously that the free nations can hardly afford to let nationalistic pride and narrow service jealousies interfere with the full and free exchange of scientific research and engineering knowledge. It is too late for that.

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European Union: A Progress Report

THEODORE H. WHITE

ONLY a historian with a generation's hindsight will be able to untangle all the wires now tangled in the negotiations to create a European army. These negotiations are now approaching a climax; within the next few weeks they will either come to real fruition or be whittled down to a practically meaningless compromise.

Of all the pressures that are being brought to bear on the negotiations, the strongest come from the fear of Soviet Russia. Next strongest is the influence of the United States. That suasion flows in tides—in peaks of pressure—and in ebbs of apparent indifference. At this moment in Paris the pressure of the United States, exerted jointly by Ambassador David Bruce and General Eisenhower, is at all-time intensity.

The reason for this peak pressure is that very soon the Administration must go to Congress to present its global defense plans for the coming year and to demand the billions of dollars necessary to support them. For more than a year, Congress has been told by Pentagon planners that the easiest way of building a European defense barrier against the Russians is by the creation of a German army. Only the intervention in midsummer of last year by the three top administrators of U.S. policy in Europe (Eisenhower, Bruce, and U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy) braced the Administration to resist the apparently quick solution of the defense problem by immediate recruitment of Germans. In July, the three pointed out that the immediate creation of a German military force might result in a split with France, wreck NATO, and destroy all hopes of west European unity. The personal prestige of the three, coupled with the authority of their position, bought time for American diplomacy

Jean Monnet

to urge Europeans all fall and much of the winter into a defense community that could safely mobilize German resources.

No Excuses Accepted

There has, however, always been a time limit to these efforts and it is now running out. In February, first General Omar Bradley, then Secretary Dean Acheson must go to the Hill to explain to Congress why and how much money and arms are needed for support of the European defense effort. The first question they will be asked is: "What about the Germans?" They cannot offer as justification the story of the fatiguing negotiations that have been going on for almost a year. Nor can they insist too much on the delay being caused by the French Ministerial crisis. They need to present, if not a ready-made European army, at least the early and solid prospect of one based on hard agreement. Thus Pentagon pressure builds up on Eisenhower and State Department pressure builds up on Bruce to get Europeans somehow, anyhow, committed to a new army that will include Germans. And Eisenhower and Bruce, personally and through their aides, at every level, in conferences, lunches, at midnight sessions over cold chicken and red wine, press, urge, and cajole Europeans to finish the treaty creating the European army in time to satisfy Congress.

The persistent American pressure has naturally built up counter-resistance. That resistance comes from all the partners of the negotiations, but it is voiced most eloquently by a man who, more than any other in our time, has seen the vision of Europe whole. He is Jean Monnet, father of the Schuman Plan, architect of the European army, and chief French negotiator. Monnet's difference with the Americans is not one of substance but of timing. He says that Europe cannot be hurried, cannot be created to a deadline, even if the deadline is set by the U. S. Congress. So many centuries of tradition must be fused; one cannot expect to link in a few months what two thousand years have kept asunder. Monnet—and the Belgians, Dutch, Italians, French, and Germans, in that order—all want time to think about what they've been setting on paper. They must have time to prepare parliaments, assemblies, and public opinions. They know they cannot create their united Europe and European army without vast quantities of American aid. But even this American aid must be of such a nature as to assist the Europe that exists now, not the one that should come into being to satisfy the impatience of Congress.

Beneath these pressures are lesser ones that can best be examined by

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studying the year-end conference of the Foreign Ministers of the six uniting nations.

The conference defined some areas of progress and some of indecisiveness. The area of progress is seen in the agreement that the French, German, and Italian Foreign Ministers worked out in the autumn months. They agreed, in substance, that all European powers should turn over immediately their national armies to the command of the new defense community, and that this community should be run by an executive board and president, subject to policy decisions of the Council of Ministers, in turn subject to a European Assembly elected by direct popular vote. A three-year transitional period was allowed for working out the constitutional details of these new organs. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the financial contributions of each power to the European army during this three-year period be fixed by the Temporary Council Committee of NATO until the new Assembly should be operative.

The precise definition of Germany's role has not yet been drawn up. Just what types of arms it will make must be decided not only between France and Germany but also among Germany and the United States and Britain, which also retain occupation and restriction rights in Germany. Germany certainly could be permitted to make field guns and small arms, and the French now urge that all restriction on German scientific research be abolished. Whether Germany would be permitted to have a navy, build planes, and construct tanks is dubious. Similarly, Germany's financial contribution to the new army would depend on whether it is supposed to pay expenses for other western powers' armies of occupation. But on all matters within their direct competence, the German and French Foreign Ministers came to an astonishing degree of agreement.



The Little Three

But while the Big Three—France, Germany, and Italy—stood united and pressed for quick agreement on the treaty, the Little Three—Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg—hung back.

In essence, the Little Three want to move slowly in the three-year transitional period until they know just how the constitutional details of the Assembly are to be worked out—until they are satisfied they are not going to give up even a fraction of their sovereignty. They are inclined to consider the new European army as an old-fashioned allied force within the larger group of allied forces that constitute NATO.

At every prickly point of the negotiations, the smaller powers bunched together instinctively. The big powers want the treaty binding for fifty years, the Little Three for a much shorter period. The Big Three want to put power into the hands of a small executive board of three men; the small powers want an executive board of six men, one for each national Cabinet, to be concerned only with fundamental policy and to act by majority vote. The Little Three want the council bound by unanimity and directly supervisory, which would make it as cumbersome as the Security Council of the U.N.

Other substantive matters bother the small powers equally. Belgium and Holland are comparatively rich. They do not want to be taxed for an army recruited from the German unemployed. They fear they will be swallowed up in the new Assembly (as the little American states feared they would be swallowed up in Congress in our Constitutional Convention of 1787) unless they are given a number of seats strikingly out of proportion to their population.

Lesser matters worry them too. The Dutch, for example, fear that if the Europeans make a strong united army, the Americans may eventually pull their troops out of Europe and thus destroy the foundation on which their security rests. Both they and the Belgians feel that if they share American weapons with Germany, they will get less than the present allocation. The Belgians claim that they cannot delegate the power to tax their citizens to an international authority without constitutional amendments and an election. And if there is an election the Belgian Social Christian Party may lose its precarious majority.



Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Clock Ticks On

These hesitations of the Little Three are not to be brushed aside. Unless the French Assembly sees a number of ex-Allies as well as ex-enemies included in the new European army, it may reject the whole plan when it comes to ratification. To convince the Belgians and Dutch, therefore, American diplomacy is now working at frantic speed in The Hague and Brussels.

Here matters rest. The Lisbon conference of NATO has already been postponed once for the negotiating powers to work out a solution. The French Government has been overthrown by a revolt of the Assembly on a bitter budget debate, and now there is the danger that the new Cabinet will remove the hitherto irremovable Foreign Minister Schuman, whose name symbolizes European unity. Belgium, too, has had a Cabinet crisis. Meanwhile, the calendar of the U.S. Congress moves relentlessly on to the date when it must decide what Europe will be given in the coming year.

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The Moral Crisis Of Western Germany

JACOB K. JAVITS

Congressman Javits, Republican of New York, recently returned from a trip to Germany as a member of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. This is a partial report on what he observed there.

WHAT WE face in Germany and western Europe today is essentially a moral crisis rather than an economic or military one. There is a widespread spirit of neutralism, which is another word for defeatism. Should this spirit really take hold, the Mutual Security Program, NATO, and our other efforts for the integration of Europe would be left without heart or spirit.

In West Germany the neutralist concept is picturesquely termed *"ohne mich"* ("without me")—that is, let western Europe be defended, but not by Germans. Those who think that the Germans are waiting only for permission from the western Allies to rebuild the Wehrmacht just don't know the situation. West Germans, especially the youth, have no real will to fight; they are more fed up with war than many Americans realize.

But one enthusiastically accepted idea in West Germany is the integration of Europe, meaning Europe's economic and political federation. The very same West German youth are attracted by the idea of a European army.

Which Kind of Unity?

The Soviet Union's propagandist bid for negotiations on the unification of the East and West Zones of Germany has made a considerable impression in West Germany, especially among the nine million refugees from the German provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse line and the provinces taken over by Czechoslovakia and Poland. Many of these people have welcomed the Russian proposal, even though it must be obvious to them that unification by negotiation rather than by free elections could result only in all of Germany's becoming a new Soviet satellite.

Probably the Russians have not marched on western Europe so far because they fear that their industrial plant is inadequate to sustain a large-scale and long-continued war, and because they know that the United States will inevitably resist any move on western Europe. While they might win the first battle, they know that they could not hope to win the war.

The Glittering Prize

But with the industrial complex of West Germany in their hands, the Soviets could begin to rival us in industrial terms. Steel production in the Soviet Union and its satellites is estimated at about 40 million tons a year. Add the productive capacity of West Germany, and the total comes to 55 million tons, more than half of our own. Within military reach would be another 20 million tons of steel capacity in France and Belgium. Unification now, on Soviet terms, would at the very least neutralize forty-eight million West Germans in their central strategic position.

Unification is very attractive to millions of West Germans not only on nationalistic grounds but on the practical ground of trade opportunities. Before the Second World War, trade with the East accounted for thirty per cent of Germany's total. It is now reduced to a fifth of what it was. German industrialists still dream of the markets of of the Soviet satellites in eastern Europe and the Balkans, those of China, and of the Soviet Union itself. Germany's illegal trade with the East in various strategic items is already believed to exceed by far its legal trade with these areas.

German industrial productivity and the German appetite for work, the greatest in western Europe, must have outlets, either to the east or in an integrated Europe.

The question of the unification of the West and East Zones of Germany emphasizes another point. It is becoming clear that one of the most effective ways of turning back the menace of Communist aggression or subversion is through attempts to detach the satellite powers from the Soviet





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Union. The violent Soviet reaction to Tito's defection and the equally violent Soviet reaction to the possibility of West Germany's acquiring some defensive capability show how sensitive the Russians are to what happens in their peripheral zone. It will be remembered, too, with what panic the Soviet Union reacted when in 1947 Czechoslovakia displayed interest in the Marshall Plan. History may indeed record that the tide of Communist expansion began to recede for good when Tito left the Cominform.

Rubble in East Berlin

Therefore our aim must be not to make available to the Soviet bloc, on Soviet initiative, a new satellite in unified Germany, but rather to maintain the attraction of democracy in West Germany and west Berlin, where conditions are in such marked contrast to those in Soviet areas.

In Berlin particularly, this situation is highlighted because passage between various sectors is for the most part unrestricted, and residents of the Russian Zone can compare the beautifully lighted shops of the Kurfürstendamm and the well-advanced reconstruction with the bleak darkness of their own districts, where progress in rebuilding is three years behind that in the western sectors. The people of the eastern sector may wonder why the only impressive construction work there has been on Communist Party headquarters, the lavish Soviet Embassy, the Propaganda Ministry, and new housing for S.E.D. (Communist) party functionaries. The contrast is so unfavorable that the Communist East German government is belatedly launching a "people's voluntary work movement" to clean up the rubble.

In West Germany there are other disquieting signs of the moral crisis that faces western Europe. Despite our de-Nazification program former members of the Nazi Party wield great influence in industry and business and also in the government. The managements of the Ruhr steel and coal companies are composed largely of men who occupied the same positions during the Hitler régime, and were members of the Nazi Party. It is said, of course, that as Nazis they were not "activists," and that they joined the party only to protect their jobs.

But this kind of moral weakness is hardly reassuring for the future. West Germany's trade unions, which are the nation's most vital pro-democratic force, have fortunately fought for and won a federal codetermination law entitling them to name an equal number of members of the supervisory boards of the basic coal and iron-and-steel companies. These boards are equivalent to our boards of directors, and the new law also enables the unions to name one of the three managers of each company, which counterbalances to some extent the presence of the former Nazis.

'Let western Europe be defended, but not by Germans'

Nazis in Bonn

Nazis are apparently not having much trouble in creeping back into the government. The new Foreign Ministry is alleged to be heavily staffed with former Nazi Party members—an estimated 134 out of 383 of the higher-ranking officials and employees. The charge is being investigated by the Bundestag and has not been denied by the Adenauer Government, which defends itself by saying that the men in question were not "activists."

The strength of neo-Nazi political parties in at least three West German states—Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bavaria—is another indication of this trend.

Associations of former soldiers and officers are growing, and former members of Heinrich Himmler's "elite" S.S. have had the presumption—and have considered the time ripe—to plan a reunion for the purpose of forming a permanent association.

A leading Berlin official told me that neo-Nazism was not the most imminent danger, but was indeed alarming. But neo-Nazi activity offers a rallying point for discontented youth, unhappy refugees and expellees, and surplus women. It seems more than alarming.

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What makes the situation so risky is that a fundamental, though not necessarily expressed, tenet of neo-Nazism is a new alliance with the Soviet Union. There is in fact grave suspicion in many quarters that the neo-Nazi groups in West Germany get considerable support, moral and possibly even financial, from the Russian Zone Communists.

The soil in which neo-Nazism can take root is altogether too plentiful in West Germany. The feeling exists that Hitler, not the Germans, started the Second World War, and therefore why should there be any restrictions or prohibitions on Germans? Also, the notion persists that Hitler's big mistake was in attacking the Russians and not adhering to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939—a mistake that must never be repeated. These are the kind of ideas that give such an unnerving aspect to many other political and economic events in West Germany.

The Big Test

There is a test coming up in West Germany and in western Europe that cannot be avoided. The way in which it is resolved is likely to determine the outcome of the moral crisis that I have described in West Germany. That test is the formation of the European army. I do not want to minimize the importance of the Schuman Plan for the integration of western Europe's coal and steel resources. But international economic co-operation is not so new a concept as that of a supranational organization for defense, which now has to replace the historic system of defensive alliances. Also, the problems of supranational control of a European army are of such a character that they will, if successfully solved, inevitably lead to a supranational parliament and executive and to political integration of western Europe as well.

The European army project has great support in West Germany, and its success is probably the only way of getting West German backing in the defense of the West without at the same time running the danger of re-creating an aggressive Germany. The European army project seems to be meeting its greatest opposition in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain—aside, of course, from the protests of Kurt Schumacher's Social

'Unification is very attractive to Germans'

Democratic Party in West Germany, whose demands concerning Germany's equality of status I believe will finally not be insurmountable. The real danger lies in the hesitation, delay, and captiousness of the other western European participants. At every such sign of trouble, the West Germans, who lack any long-standing democratic tradition and are not accustomed to parliamentary delays, tend to become disheartened, give up, and go neutralist and pro-Soviet or neo-Nazi and pan-German.

The chancelleries of western Europe are aware of this possibility, and it accounts for the recent attempts of the Foreign Ministers to accelerate progress toward federation. They also recognize the fact that U.S. public opinion is in a mood to demand western European federation. But we have had previous instances of projects that seemed to be going along well until they collided with the accumulated traditions and prejudices that western Europeans so freely acknowledge but are often powerless to overcome.

Beyond Europe's Borders

A federated Europe could also concentrate on the greatly intensified development of vast areas in Africa and South and Southeast Asia that are still under the colonial or administrative control or influence of western European powers. The importance of such development cannot be overemphasized. One of the greatest hindrances to maintaining both an adequate defense establishment and an adequate economic offensive in the underdeveloped areas in the rest of the world is the lack of financial resources in western Europe.

These could best be built up by intensive development of tremendously rich areas such as those in Africa which are still controlled by individual powers whose resources are not great enough

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for the development job that must be done and done quickly for the sake of the free world's security.

Nor is the colonialist tradition as much of an obstacle to such a program as many would think. First, the areas in question are grossly underpopulated, and western Europe must find outlets for its excess population. Second, the program would not involve the exploitation of wealth but the production of new wealth that would benefit the local populations and the free world as a whole.

German Energies

I shall not soon forget the submarine pens in Hamburg harbor, their twelve-foot reinforced-concrete roofs caved in as a result of British demolition, but still looking as formidable as the Germany that is now dormant under the ruins of its former military power. When I remembered that German military power had been created in the short five years from 1934 to 1939, I understood even better why it is vital for us to employ German energies.

I have not referred in detail to the vitality of the democratic elements in West Germany, to the fact that there is a new spirit in certain areas of higher education, as evidenced in the Free University of Berlin and the University of Frankfurt. Nor have I referred to fighting newspapers like the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and the *Stuttgarter Zeitung,* or to the determined free trade-union movement, the DGB (really a combined AFL and CIO), with six million members.

Leaders of these democratic elements are forced to admit that theirs may not be the preponderant voice in West Germany today, but theirs is the potential for leadership in democratic ideas and practice that we must help bring to realization.

This point leads directly to my conclusion that the moral crisis in western Europe and in West Germany cannot yet be considered resolved. West Germany could go neutralist and pro-Soviet or chauvinist and neo-Nazi on the one hand, or on the other it could be an invaluable component of a federated Europe and a resurgent West. The free world cannot afford to abandon West Germany. We must stay there, physically with troops and economic aid, morally through the authority of our representatives and the backing of the American people, until the road ahead in terms of an integrated Europe is clear and unchangeable.

Politics and the Po

The waters that engulfed Italy's richest farming region create new obstacles for the nation's already tough defense program

CLAIRE STERLING

AMONG the thousands of Italians who, two months after one of the worst natural disasters in their country's history, are still displaced or threatened by runaway water, there are a number of theories as to why the great Po River rose up against them. Some say it was a trial sent by God to test their faith. Flood experts say it was *fame e fiume*—hunger and the river—the fault of land-starved peasants who, by crowding up to the very water's edge for numberless generations, have narrowly confined the river between artificial banks. The Left blames it on atomic-bomb tests in Nevada and the "criminal negligence of the Christian Democratic Government." Immemorially, Italians have blamed the government for all evils. *Piove—governo ladro,* the saying goes here. "It's raining—the government is crooked."

Since November 14, when the first big levees gave way at Occhiobello, the Po has shown the peasants little quarter. For ten days, it ran over the Po plain in a crazy rush to the sea. The Adriatic surged to meet it. When both subsided, they left twenty billion cubic feet of water over hundreds of square miles of land. Aside from a few elevated spots, the water has remained upon the most fertile soil of Italy; for the first fifty days the area was blanketed by thick, icy fog.

Not since 1152, when the Po overran the land to form a new tributary and delta, has it brought so much hardship to the people in its valley. While the fog and water remain, no one can tell how costly the destruction has been. A third of the flooded land is below sea level, and it will be many months, perhaps more than a year, befor this can be drained. Portions of it will then be buried so deep under stone and sand that they will be useless; others will be so thickly coated with clay that it will take at least three years to put them under cultivation again. A third of the country's methane-gas wells, which had promised to bring an industrial revolution to the North, are under water. The loss of homes and buildings has not been estimated; besides those swept away, others continue to fall and still more are expected to during and after the winter frosts.

In its preliminary estimate of the

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damage, the Government put the loss of buildings and public utilities at about $320 million. Besides this, there is the destruction of crops already in the ground; the prevention or limitation of spring planting; the immediate loss in industrial production; the total or partial ruin of machinery and raw materials; the disappearance of household goods. So far it has cost about $3 million a month to keep the refugees alive. All of this might bring the total to $700 million or $800 million.

Relief versus Defense

The Kremlin could not have hoped for a better-timed disaster. The flood reached its highest in December, when the NATO conference opened in Rome; the sum in damages was almost exactly what Italy had promised to spend for rearmament next year. As Prime Minister de Gasperi was welcoming the NATO delegates in the capital, the Communists were propounding a simple arithmetic lesson in thousands of leaflets throughout the stricken North: Po Losses=NATO Budget. The Prime Minister was wondering how much of his former promise he could keep.

Even before the emergency, the prospect of a $590-million national deficit had made it dubious whether the arms budget could get through Parliament, especially since the conservative Minister of the Budget, Giuseppe Pella, was by no means sold on it. To double the deficit now was unthinkable. The Government would either have to renege on some of its commitments to NATO, which would have been embarrassing and unsafe, or neglect close to a quarter of a million refugees, which was impossible.

By now there is probably no political leader in Italy who has not virtuously deplored any attempt to make capital of the misery of the flood victims. The political stakes of the flood have, however, been apparent to everybody—particularly to the Communists, who find the prospects alluring, and to the Christian Democrats, who find them alarming.

It would be easier for de Gasperi if his Cabinet had complete authority to handle the crisis. In the Po Valley however, as in some other regions, the municipal and provincial governments and other sources of local power, such as the trade unions, are mostly in the hands of the Communists. In the disaster, the Christian Democrats have had to try to work side by side with the Communists, and the Communists have done their best to make this impossible.

Panic in Rovigo

For the first forty-eight hours the Communists had the field to themselves. They set up emergency committees, working out of central headquarters in the provincial capital of Rovigo, which took control, efficiently and resourcefully, of rescue and relief work.

Then the Army arrived—several thousand soldiers strong—and with it came the Red Cross, the Pontifical Assistance Commission, and companies of American, French, and British troops from Trieste and Vienna. On their heels, there poured into Rovigo a stream of Cabinet Ministers, Under Secretaries, Senators and Deputies of every political faction, and the Prime Minister himself.

With the national government moving in, the Communists seemed to lose interest in straight relief work and concentrated on creating political embarrassments for their enemies. The first clash broke out within three days. With water closing in on Rovigo from three sides, the big shots from the capital were assembled in the prefect's office when, at midnight, a rumor reached them that Rovigo was in imminent danger.

In an improvised meeting the Cabinet considered routing out the forty thousand inhabitants, but decided not to, since there seemed to be no basis to the rumor. The Communists' chief agitprop man in the area, Gian Carlo Pajetta, who had been in and out of the *prefettura* all evening, thereupon ordered out the party's sound truck—the only one in the city—and it roamed the streets, ordering people to evacuate at once, on foot if necessary. The warning, which turned out to be completely uncalled for, produced a city-wide panic. Presently the prefect ordered the Communists to dissolve their Emergency Committees at once. He said the committees were interested in propaganda, not in flood relief; were spreading false rumors, misdirecting rescue teams, and misrepresenting themselves as government authorities; were causing confusion in the allocation of food and relief supplies and diverting them to their own use.

There was enough obvious truth in

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these accusations to make the Communists lose almost as much as they had gained in the first two days. They thought that in the chaos their calculated attempts to spread confusion might have escaped general notice. But in some places even their own rank and file revolted against them; the firemen of Ferrara, for instance, reportedly tore up their party cards.

More Water?

With nature's help, the Communists have slowly been able to recoup. The passage of time is making the Government's problem more and more desperate. Before reconstruction can begin, even before the land-ocean can be emptied, there is the danger of renewed wildness from the Po. The river rose fairly high in early January, and will rise higher in the spring; and engineers are working feverishly to plug the breaks.

Assuming this can be done before the deadline, there is the water already over the Po plain. It still covers more than four hundred square miles. Of the 350,000 people who left in the first exodus, over 150,000 are living in government shelters, on a daily subsidy of 250 lire—about forty cents—for the heads of families, and an additional hundred lire for each dependent.

Whatever the hardships, most of these people want to go home. The Government has been unable to decide whether to let them or not; it knows that however it decides, the Communists will profit. It has settled the matter by letting people go home at their own risk, which is considerable. Whoever returns—and thousands are going, on foot and by rowboat—loses not only the Government's subsidy but its protection. Since their Emergency Committees were dissolved, the Communists have refused to organize effective assistance in the communities they control. On the other hand, the Government, whether out of shortsightedness or fear that it will be accused of military interference, has withdrawn most of the soldiers.

Without an effective police force, there is no way to keep people out of houses that might fall at any moment, no safeguard against explosion from faulty gas mains, no guarantee of a steady food supply—and no drinking water. With hundreds of animal carcasses still floating—it has been impossible to bury or burn them all—there is a terrifying danger of epidemic. Although the authorities have vaccination serums, only ten per cent of the refugees have agreed to use them, and a number of cases of typhus have already been reported in Adria, thirteen miles from Rovigo.

Worst of all, there is no work. Of the total area under water, two-thirds must be drained by pump if a precious year is not to be lost. The technicians estimate that thirty huge pumps could do the work in two hundred days. Even that is too long a time to permit spring planting, which must begin early in April.

All this is academic, however, for there are no such pumps in Italy. The pumps normally available in the Po Valley are under water; there are large ones in Rome and Milan, but they are owned by private contractors who have either not been asked to surrender them or have refused. Factories in Milan could make some, but that would take at least a few months. Western Germany has donated fourteen pumps, but they are too small to make a real difference. Until equipment can be found or produced, the Government can only try to drain the flooded area with hand labor, and wait for the water to subside.

The longer the delay, the more difficult the Government's position becomes. Until the peasants can farm their land, they must be fed. The Communists, who have no objection to letting the land lie under water, are quietly trying to create distrust of whatever pumps may arrive. They are spreading word through the towns that the flood might provide work for three years—if the machines don't interfere. In a pinch, Stalinists are sometimes willing even to reverse the Industrial Revolution.

Politics as Usual

In Rome, politics are in full swing. In the first days of the flood, Togliatti, like his men around the Po, did not seem to have thought out his strategy very carefully. His first effort was to adapt the catastrophe to the Cominform line. "Would the damage be so great," he asked, "if the whole economic structure of the country for decades and decades had not been criminally distorted by régimes which lived—and live—by destroying national unity, making war, preparing new wars, and in this way squandering instead of enjoying the fruits of the little we have?" Briefly, the Wall Street warmongers had been responsible for the flood. For all his cleverness, Togliatti this time was foolish. It was a serious blunder to offer such stale polemics at a time when the nation was drawn together as it had been by no other event since Caporetto.

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It remained for Pietro Nenni, Togliatti's Socialist ally, to rescue the Left by a masterful speech in Parliament. The whole country, he said, was united in its grief, and the times called for an internal truce. By that, he said, he did not mean that all political argument should be forgotten—which would be unreasonable—but only that the Opposition parties should give up the "dogmatism" that had characterized them during the last three years.

The country, he went on, must now take an inventory of its resources and its needs. He agreed with the head of the Italian equivalent of the N.A.M. that "not a man, not a cent must be diverted from the work of reconstruction." The huge costs involved would require a profound change in economic policy, "eliminating," as he put it delicately, "all non-productive and postponable items." Failing a minimum common agreement, he said, there could be neither reconstruction nor rearmament. "It would be lacking in good faith now," he concluded, "to spread division in the working class, or to accuse us, who want to assure the security of the Po, of neglecting the security of our frontiers. As for our side, if de Gasperi has a Minister ready to undertake the grave responsibility of reconstruction, let him be appointed. He will have the support of all of us. The hour of polemics can be postponed for a time."

Even Nenni's worst enemies were stirred by his speech. The Prime Minister was openly moved. He told the Deputies that they should be inspired by Nenni's words; and, turning to Togliatti, he added: "As for you, you would do better not to mix your voice with Nenni's, since it is in such clear contrast to his."

In spite of his emotion, however, de Gasperi knew quite well that the Socialists could no more put politics aside than he could himself. Even while he spoke, he must have realized how strong the appeal would be to the people, and how damaging to his Government.

Togliatti saw the value of Nenni's statesmanship at once, and hurriedly adopted it as his own. The struggle to rebuild the Po Valley presently became a "sacred battle" against the elements. The Communists have been trying to appropriate the word "Po" as they have the word "peace" scrawled on every countryside wall; the choice between reconstruction and rearmament has become the dominant issue in Italian politics.

Another Crisis

De Gasperi's Government has lived through so many crises, each of which has looked fatal, that it would be foolish to predict the outcome of this one. The only safe thing to say is that things are very serious for the Christian Democrats. The new and urgent need for money is putting the Cabinet at the mercy not only of the Left, which of course wants to abandon rearmament altogther, but of strong groups within and to the right of the Christian Democrats.

These are the big landowners, and their big worry is agricultural reform. Under the Government's reform program, passed recently after a long debate, the subdivision of big estates that were lying partly fallow has begun. The big landowners have accordingly become acutely sensitive to the plight of the flood victims. "How can we justify such great expenses [as the land-reform program]," the powerful conservative newspaper *Il Messagero* said, "when all available resources should be devoted to putting the stricken land back into cultivation?"

Since de Gasperi has so far refused to touch either the arms budget or the land-reform fund, he has been able to get almost no money at all. After twenty days of debate, Parliament has approved an initial appropriation of $30 million for the Po Valley—with the leftist bloc abstaining on the grounds that it was not enough. The Government has already collected 16 billion lire in a national emergency loan which was launched on January 1, and unprecedentedly generous private contributions are coming in from abroad and from all sections and classes of Italy. But most of the money either must come from new taxes or from one of the two critical items in the budget—rearmament and land reform.

While de Gasperi tries to find a way out of this trap, Togliatti is counting on the historic inertia of the state bureaucracy to take care of anything that nature, and his party, might have overlooked. The Government's first spurt of energy, which was admirable, has slackened off. The Minister appointed by de Gasperi to co-ordinate reconstruction is Giuseppe Brusasce, whose record so far does not promise the resolute, courageous leadership that the situation requires.

The Christian Democratic Government is caught between a dire set of alternatives. On all fronts—the Po plain, rearmament, land reform—it must move with caution, weighing one cost against another, defense against relief, and both against urgently needed reform. But the greater its circumspection, the more it is exposed to what is perhaps the worst danger—not acting at all.

In the first two rounds of the municipal elections, the Christian Democrats have lost twenty per cent of their popular vote as compared with the 1948 national elections. The third and final round of these elections comes in May.

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Communism In France and Italy

THEODORE DRAPER

COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE, by Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Aldo Garosci. *Cornell University Press. 229 pages. $3.00.*

THE UNFUNNIEST farce of the season was performed at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris recently. The U.S. Congress was caught handing out $100 million to support subversive elements. An American Congressman had to plead that an Act of Congress did not necessarily mean what it said.

That awkward item in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was intended, of course, to apply to subversive elements in the Soviet Union and its satellites only. There was something weirdly indecent about the spectacle of the Soviets complaining bitterly against their own favorite type of philanthropy. But perhaps there was one aspect of this depressing joke that deserves more serious consideration.

Obviously Congress had reacted in its clumsy way to widespread pressure that something should be done to turn back the tide of Communism in eastern Europe. Mass-circulation magazines have been assiduously feeding this demand. High-powered private organizations have dedicated themselves to the same cause.

Four years ago, the shadow of Communism upon western Europe was frightening enough to make possible the Marshall Plan. If we now preoccupy ourselves with eastern Europe, aren't we forgetting something?

In Italy there is a Communist movement that, at the latest count, reported 2,580,765 members. The Communist bloc obtained 36.9 per cent of the total vote in the last municipal elections. It controls the main trade-union federation. It probably has the brainiest leader in Italian politics today.

The French Communist Party has almost 800,000 members. It received 26.5 per cent of the votes cast in the last election. It also controls the strongest trade-union organization. It boasts the best collection of domesticated intellectuals in the country.

The existence of such big, powerful Communist movements in these cradles of western culture may be so painful that we prefer to concentrate our attention elsewhere. Glamorous tales about the resistance movements in little Albania or even Slovakia make much more cheerful reading.

The very subject is the first merit of *Communism in Western Europe.* The title is somewhat of a misnomer. The book is about French and Italian Communism, not "western" Communism, which would have had to take in a good deal more ground. In fact, a book on western Communism as a whole would have been considerably less discouraging.

As far as it goes, this is a brave, honest, capable, pioneer effort. It was planned by Professor Mario Einaudi of Cornell University, who contributes the first section, which seeks to point out the common denominator in the French and Italian experiences. Jean-Marie Domenach, editor of the left-wing Catholic organ *Esprit*, analyzes the French Communist Party. Aldo Garosci, a veteran of the Italian "Justice and Freedom" movement, deals with his country's Communists.

Since the longest of the three essays is only about ninety pages, there is not much space left over after the indispensable minimum of historical background, politics, and statistics. More emphasis even within this narrow framework might have been placed on economic influences. If the reader considers the book only as an introduction, he is not likely to be disappointed.

'Our Own' Communists

For me, it was refreshing to see Europeans who reject Communism in principle write about "their own" Communist movements with familiarity and sophistication. Since Communism in the United States has never amounted to much numerically, there is some excuse for Americans to dismiss the whole thing as a Russian conspiracy. But Europeans can have no such illusions. Almost everyone, at least in France and Italy, is likely to have a relative or a neighbor who is in the Communist movement. So many hard-working, well-meaning, simple people have been won over that it is quite possible to regard them more with sorrow than with anger.

Writing from an independent leftist viewpoint. Domenach gives full credit to Communist leader Maurice Thorez's popularity, "'statesmanlike qualities," and organizational abilities. Garosci remarks that Palmiro Togliatti is "indeed a man of culture, endowed as well with many private virtues." Europeans cannot afford to treat the Communist leaders with contempt.

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Yet, as both writers emphasize, the Communist leaderships have remained remarkably stable. Togliatti has headed the Italian party since 1926, Thorez the French party since 1932. But the masses did not flock behind them until the end of the Second World War. What explains the virtual political monopoly of the French and Italian Communist Parties over the working class after the Second World War?

So Many of Them

Domenach and Garosci make a sharp distinction between the authentic national character of the French and Italian Communist movements and the foreign interests they serve. Domenach expresses it this way: "The French Communist reality which succeeded in allying a foreign method and a foreign ideology with the French mentality, and its wide and diverse recruitment gives the party an incontestably French substance." This very complex formula for a simple fact is a good starting point: We are dealing with hundreds of thousands of ordinary Frenchmen and Italians, not with masquerading Slavs or Orientals. The popular American conception of an unbalanced, abnormal Communist type makes no sense in countries where there are so many Communists.

Garosci says that the Italian Communists have "succeeded in occupying nearly the same position held by the Socialists in 1919." This is just the kind of long-range perspective we need most badly. It can save us from some very tempting and treacherous illusions, especially those connected with the Marshall Plan.

Our foreign-aid program has had an "emergency" basis. But the problem we face has nothing of an emergency character about it. The Communists did not win away the majority of workers in Italy and France from the so-called bourgeois parties, as they would have to do in the United States. The workers never belonged to them. The Communists did not create a new class cleavage. They moved into the prepared positions of an old one.

We have yet to face frankly enough the paradox that Communism in France and Italy has a much bigger and stronger mass basis for taking and holding power than it had in any of the Soviet satellites in eastern Europe.

Politically, the acid test of the Marshall Plan is what it has done about the Communist Party's power in the West. If the Marshall Plan in France and Italy was merely supposed to rehabilitate the productive systems of those two countries, it has probably done well enough. But Professor Einaudi warns us that the membership of the the two Communist Parties has probably declined "no more than ten or twenty per cent in any case," their electoral strength has remained intact, and the militants have increased in numbers and effectiveness. About the best that can be said is that they have been held to a draw. The political situation in France and Italy resembles the military situation in Korea.

Can this be attributed to superior Communist leadership, organizational efficiency, and propaganda? Practically all the Communist leaders are old war horses who have learned few new tricks, and the organizational setup and propaganda are also an old story. The secret may not be in the Communist movement at all.

My impression is that the French and Italian Communists have been winning most of their political battles within the working class largely by default. Their tactics and propaganda have not been so brilliant that they should have been able to withstand the offensive of the Marshall Plan so successfully—if the elemental needs and feelings of the working class had not been too long ignored. As Domenach points out, the circulation of *L'Humanité* dropped from 460,000 in December, 1947, to 220,000 in July, 1951. But the French Communist vote went down only from 5,489,000 in 1946 to 5,039,000 in 1951. This shows that the popular influence is out of all proportion to the effectiveness of the press. In fact, even the party membership is way out of line.

Are the Communists so strong because the other parties are so weak? Or are the other parties so weak because the Communists are so strong? This is far from being merely a verbal difference. It is a crucial consideration. The distinction is whether the Communists have thrived on the feebleness and inadequacy of their opposition or whether they have earned their strength principally because of the cogency of their own program.

True to the Past

After all, the Communist following in Italy and France more or less represents the traditional Left. The socialist movement in Italy before Mussolini, and in France before the Second World War, had democratic leadership. The tragedy is that most Communist voters, if not actual party members, think that they are being true to their past; being Left is more important than being democratic. Where the weakness of the democratic parties leaves an opening, the Communists and the fascists have abundantly proven that they can take advantage of it. Professor Einaudi mentions that the combined membership of the French Socialist and M.R.P. Parties fell from 535,000 in 1945 to 250,000 in 1950, or about one-quarter of the Communist membership in the latter year. According to Domenach, the 1951 election showed that the votes lost by the French Communists landed in the camp of the opposite extreme, the Gaullists.

It is futile to imagine that this problem can be handled on an "emergency" basis. It is the continuous crisis of our time. We will be getting our money's worth out of the Marshall Plan only if we see how to bring the European Left that has gone astray back to the democratic side. In any case, it would be a good idea to turn back the tide of Communism a little more successfully in the heart of western Europe before getting excited about the possibilities in eastern Europe.

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History and Dean Acheson

AUGUST HECKSCHER

THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY. Edited by McGeorge Bundy from the Record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. *Houghton Mifflin. 301 pp. $4.00.*

APART from the controversy that has surrounded him, Dean Acheson will long remain a figure worth studying. He is, up to this time, unique in the American experience; it is just possible that he will remain so. For Mr. Acheson is in many ways the very archetype of the diplomat—subtle, flexible, aware of the complexity of human relationships—yet a diplomat forced to play his role against the irrational forces and seething passions of our twentieth-century democracy.

We have had in our history men as subtle and worldly wise as he. But, like Franklin, Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams, they have been able to act from a secure base, comparatively isolated from popular tides. Only Mr. Acheson has been forced to maneuver in two directions at once—to engage, to pacify, and not infrequently to outwit both his critics at home and governments abroad. What has been the result?

McGeorge Bundy of Harvard has set forth the record with a fullness and objectivity which invite at least a tentative judgment. In his preface he indicates criticisms of the State Department—haste in German rearmament, optimism in early estimates of Communist China, vagueness in administration of the loyalty programs. But the body of the book is free of praise or dispraise; it is a skillful and refreshingly impartial editing of the spoken and written words of the Secretary of State. A running commentary ties together the complex story of the last two and a half years of foreign policy.

The material for an estimate is not, needless to say, complete. As Mr. Bundy points out, the published word must ultimately be supplemented by the whole mass of documentation at present secret, and by memoirs still unwritten. What is astonishing is that so much already stands open to analysis. It is doubtful whether any Secretary of State has ever made so many statements and addresses, submitted to so many repeated questionings. And certainly none, both in extemporaneous and prepared speech, has been so lucid, so incisive, or so frequently eloquent.

The main outlines of Mr. Acheson's policy are familiar. Barring some strange tricks of future history, they will stand up as wise and even masterful attempts to stave off the catastrophe of a final East-West clash. The Marshall Plan was sketched by Acheson in a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, some weeks before the then Secretary of State made the authoritative statement at Harvard. The shaping of the Atlantic community is in large part Acheson's handiwork. The strengthening of the United Nations General Assembly so that it could act in case of aggression he conceived and led to fruition.

Classic Words, Classic Obstacles

In the East he may not have foreseen all the fearful consequences of the Chinese Communists' advance. Yet he certainly did not cause the unhappy denouement, as some of his critics imply; and when others were spreading the viciously defeatist word that our soldiers were dying in Korea for no cause and without use, Dean Acheson kept before the public the concept of a limited war fought to check aggression—a concept he made seem no less worthy of the nation's best effort than total victory and unconditional surrender.

Mr. Acheson's statements on these developing policies, which form the heart of Mr. Bundy's book, have at their best a classic touch, in the sense of having a startlingly clear and limpid quality. We argue today, for example, whether limited ground forces in Europe provide an effective deterrent to Russian attack; or whether an armistice at the 38th parallel in Korea does not violate our declared objective of unifying the country. In testimony before Congress on these and other questions the Secretary of State has given answers so stripped and final that one hopes the public will reread these, instead of reading the columnist's (or even the reviewer's) gloss.

The record draws its strength in large part from enlightened and powerful advocacy of great measures. Mr. Acheson has described his relation to his chief as that of being "frank and forthright and vigorous in counsel" and "energetic and loyal in accepting decisions and carrying them out." Yet it is perhaps impossible to be an advocate without tempering one's tone and argument to the preferences of the Opposition. Mr. Acheson's unremitting concern with Congress, his preoccupation with the press and the public, have afforded him his magnificent opportunity. They have also brought out his major deficiencies.

It has been his misfortune to deal with a singularly obtuse and virulent band of critics. He has lacked the protection of a diplomatic tradition, which might have transmitted some general understanding of his purposes and aims. Even worse, he has lacked the shield of a strong President. Mr. Acheson has faced the storm virtually alone; and it is difficult to escape the impression that he has ridden out the storm by sailing before it. "It may be," he said in a particularly revealing speech before the Harvard Alumni in 1946, "that the way to solve a difficult prob-

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lem is to transfer one's attention to an insoluble one. But I doubt it." In the years since, that doubt seems to have weakened.

The phrase "total diplomacy" was an early and disconcerting symptom of this change. At best it seemed a clever way of sounding "tough"—a device for stealing some of the thunder from the advocates of total war.

The disarmament proposals presented to the Assembly of the United Nations in Paris are outside the time limits of this book; yet they may be cited as characteristic of Mr. Acheson's recent leadership. It is doubtful, to begin with, whether in existing circumstances disarmament could ever be considered a "soluble" issue. Yet, even granting the psychological advantages of the scheme, there is little to be said for the defiant tones of Mr. Acheson's presentation. It sounded as if the applause won at San Francisco, where he appeared on television screens across the nation as the arch-antagonist of the Russians, was still ringing in his ears.

In assessing the attacks on Mr. Acheson, Mr. Bundy is particularly emphatic in denying that he has become, as so often charged, "the prisoner of his critics." If he has changed his policy with regard to military bases in Spain, Mr. Bundy asserts, it is because he has changed his policy, not because he is trying to appease Senator McCarran. If he is truculent toward the Russians, it is because he feels truculent, not because he is trying to stave off charges of being "soft."

To weigh this defense it would be necessary to evaluate motives of which Mr. Acheson himself could be only half aware. What is incontrovertible is that Mr. Acheson has grown less flexible and less imaginative as passions at home have risen. He has begun to talk, not like the diplomat who would lead the United States through an epoch of world power, but like the older type of statesman speaking for an America with no need for intricate relationships or mutual concessions.

He speaks like the older type of statesman; yet he hasn't the protective coloration and the instinctive appeal that have served others in that position. Mr. Acheson's superior mind and his frosty disposition could be forgiven him while he was promising shrewd settlements and calculated maneuvers. They seem less necessary—and therefore less forgivable—when they are merely instruments for bludgeoning an old foe.

As the diplomat serving the interests of a powerful state, Mr. Acheson could understandably adopt a reserved attitude toward popular clamors. Diplomacy requires that its practitioners be somewhat devious and aloof, working for large stakes and sometimes sacrificing minor positions dear to the public. Such a one must endure attacks and yet be impervious to them. "Although no one can ever be protected from criticism," said Mr. Acheson at the hearings on his nomination, "at least you can be sure that the criticism is not just." That was an ideal attitude for the role he intended to play, but it is hardly ideal for the traditional democratic statesman. For something in the blood of the great democratic leader makes him aware of the continual probability of error. And that quality imparts humility; it makes it possible for him to resign on an issue of confidence, even when on an issue of intellect there may appear to be no need.

The Secretary of State has played his role in one of the most fascinating experiments that a free people has ever watched. Is it possible for public opinion in a democracy to be sufficiently disinterested and restrained to see maneuvers being undertaken in the international scene and yet not cry out that it has been betrayed?—to accept a settlement without calling it a sellout, or a concession without being suspicious of treason? On the basis of Mr. Acheson's experience, the answers are not very encouraging. McGeorge Bundy (who is a Republican) holds that "the search for partisan advantage in foreign policy is a wholly disruptive occupation." Unfortunately, too many Americans have taken that type of destructiveness for normal and practical politics.

Passionless Patriot

Confronted by this discouraging evidence, Mr. Acheson has reacted as might have been expected of a man of ambition and strong character. If he has not become "the prisoner of his critics," he certainly has become something more closely resembling an old-fashioned patriot of the "our country, right or wrong" variety. He has remained, nevertheless, temperamentally unsuited for this role, never quite trusted by those whose attitudes he was attempting to reflect.

Undoubtedly, conditions in the United States at some future time may be more favorable than they have been over the years of Mr. Acheson's toils. A strong President, a settled foreign policy, a less fear-ridden public opinion, may make it possible for a man of great gifts in diplomacy to find himself and fulfill his opportunity. It must be hoped that this will be the case. We have need of talent as conspicuous as Mr. Acheson's has been in the service of democracy. His own failures and achievements will do much to guide those who in the future carry out the world tasks assigned by history to the United States.

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Hong Kong's Stockholm Traveler

THE OTHER DAY a famous Swede long missing from the international news scene turned up in one of his many disguises. To those who remember the wartime news from Germany, no figure was more familiar and indeed more helpful than a certain Stockholm Traveler. He was the anonymous figure who managed to be in Berlin the night of a big R.A.F. raid. Miraculously, he avoided death or injury by blockbuster; invariably he arrived by air in Stockholm the next morning just in time to catch the evening papers. Had not the BBC kept quoting him, it would have been impossible to hear all about the big bombings of German cities.

Lightning Calculator

Not much was ever known about this traveler except that he was amazingly fast on the getaway. Some things could be guessed about him. He apparently had his passports and visas in constant readiness; crossing a border in wartime for him was no more complicated than crossing a street. He was in solid with that section of the Gestapo which okayed all exit visas. He also had a big drag on the Swedish and German airlines; his seat was always reserved. He concentrated on Berlin, but if Stuttgart or Hamburg was being pasted he usually managed to be on the spot. Without a doubt the Stockholm Traveler was the most blitzed man in the world.

Besides being very fast on his feet, he was able to count up the dead and wounded quickly and estimate the damage accurately, right down to one-half of one per cent, before hopping his plane back to Sweden. Only he knew that seventeen per cent of the north side of Berlin was gone and that twenty-three per cent of the port of Hamburg had been irreparably wrecked.

Darting from place to place like Mercury with a hotfoot, the Stockholm Traveler occasionally lent the feature correspondents a helping hand. It was pleasant to read, on a quiet day when those infernal bombing statistics were lacking, that the Stockholm Traveler had sighted a giraffe from the Berlin Zoo calmly walking down Unter den Linden the morning after a combined U.S.A.A.F.-R.A.F. raid.

Transmigration in Action

Toward the end, when the thousand-plane daylight bombings were a weekly occurrence and the Allies were moving on the ground across the Rhine, the Stockholm Traveler, like an old soldier, simply faded away.

Then in the postwar era, when little news trickled out of the Soviet Union, there were some hints that the Stockholm Traveler was operating under the alias of A Helsinki Businessman, recently returned from Leningrad with a satchelful of news: percentage increases in the latest Five-Year Plan, rehabilitation of villages, housing statistics, the names of the workers who had received Stalin Prizes for speedups, and so on. What partially bore out these suspicions, as reported by newsmen in Europe who had spoken to the Helsinki Businessman soon after his return, were some of the familiar Stockholm Traveler's language tags, such as "reliably reported," "confirming a previously relayed report," and "checks with published statistics."

Now he has turned up again (broken through the wall of silence, as he might aptly phrase it). Accounts from the Far East have been attributed to information passed on by a handy Chinese College Student. This student usually returns from Manchuria to Hong Kong (from where news can still be transmitted around the free world) just in time to catch the late editions. He knows, according to reliable reports by correspondents stationed in Hong Kong, what splits may have developed among the People's Republic's leadership and how many ammunition dumps in southern China have been destroyed by Formosa's partisans.

Whether he travels across the mountains and seas of China by plane, boat, or the faster magic carpet of the correspondent's imagination, this jet-propelled student invariably arrives with a fresh news tidbit or corroboration of a past report. It is now reliably reported that he is the Stockholm agent in Oriental garb. This, of course, partially confirms a previously relayed report and checks with published statistics.

—HERBERT MITGANG



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

Is the nation headed for a serious doctor shortage? If so, what can be done about it? (see page 24)

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Medal of Honor



Lieutenant Frederick Henry of Clinton, Oklahoma—Medal of Honor for sacrificing himself to save his platoon in combat near Am-Dong, Korea, September 1, 1950. When the platoon could no longer hold its position, Lieutenant Henry ordered the men to pull back. But someone had to stay behind to provide covering fire. He chose to be that man, and was lost.

Always remember this—Lieutenant Henry offered his life for more than just a small platoon in far-away Korea. It was also for America. For you.

Isn't there something you can do when this man did so much? Yes, there is. You can help keep the land he loved solid and strong and secure. You can do a job for defense . . . by buying United States Defense* Bonds, *now!* For your bonds give your country greater strength. And a strong America is your best hope for peace and freedom—just as it was his.

Defense is your job, too. For the sake of *every* man in service, and for ***yours,*** start buying more United States Defense Bonds now.

Remember that when you're buying bonds for national defense, you're also building a personal reserve of cash savings. Remember, too, that if you don't save *regularly*, you generally don't save at all. Money you take home usually is money spent. So sign up today in the Payroll Savings Plan where you work, or the Bond-A-Month Plan where you bank. For your country's security, and your own, buy U. S. Defense Bonds now!

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